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THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

John Addams | VICTOR BRANFORD
| ALEXANDER FARQUHARSON

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

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
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THE SENSE OF SOCIETY :* by Sir Francis Younghusband,
K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., President of the Sociological Society,
1924-25.

LET me first express to you my appreciation of the very great honour you have done me in electing me President of this Society. I cannot hope to emulate my predecessors, Lord Balfour and Mr. Frederick Harrison, in profundity of learning. But I have at least this advantage over them, that I have had to deal practically and man to man with societies of a greater range of culture and civilisation than they had ever met. I shall, therefore, aim this evening at profiting by this special advantage. I will give you the results of my practical experience rather than discuss what may be learned from books. And if those results may surprise you at first you will, I hope, if you can bear with me to the end, find them of some little value to you.

Now I have been interested in this Society from its foundation. The original circular reached me on the Indian frontier. And it was from that distant part of the world that I wrote asking to be enrolled as a life member. But I have always felt that our Society has a legitimate grievance and one which affects me very particularly this evening. What I am going to speak about we ought to be able to call "socialism" for it is the devotion of the individual to the society to which he belongs. But the word socialism has been appropriated by the advocates of a particular theory of Government. There are apparently some five million people in this country—and I daresay some in this room—who support that theory. But personally I do not. With the savings I have made, after working for many years abroad, I have bought a small house and garden in the country—the dream of everyone who has served in India. And I dislike the idea of having my savings, my house, and my land "nationalised," and having to live where the State directs me to live, in a state-owned house with (or perhaps without) a state-owned garden, and having to come backwards and forwards to London in a state-managed railway. This may be a very pleasant arrangement for the gentleman who will benefit by my savings. But I am not convinced that it would be for the benefit of either his or my great-grandchildren or to the benefit of England a hundred years hence. However, that is only my personal view and I may be altogether wrong. But I am not wrong in being aggrieved at the exponents of this theory of government having appropriated the word socialism and socialist. For it is upon the value of sociality that I wish to dwell this evening, and unless I state so explicitly at the start, I may be thought to be a socialist and to be advocating socialism as it has now come to be understood.

*Presidential address delivered to the Society at Burlington House, on 10th November, 1924.

AND were it not for this risk of being misunderstood, I would have entitled this address "Sociality," for that more completely describes what I wish to speak to you about. I would wish to emphasise the value of sociality—the sense or consciousness or feeling of fellowship in a society, the members of which are bound together by a common purpose or a common interest. The value of individuality we all recognise. The value of sociality is not so fully appreciated. Yet the result of my observation is to show that the one is as necessary as the other. The Sociological Society has to study human societies, and there is not a single man who is an individual alone by himself. Every man is also a member of society. He is a social individual. Besides individuality he must have some slight sense of society and some sociality in him—some devotion to the whole of which he is part, whether that whole be his home, his country or mankind. And the more fully he develops this sociality, the more fully will he develop his individuality. Only as he devotes himself to his home, his profession, his country or mankind, will he be fully himself.

THIS is to be the burden of my discourse to-night.

AND first I must briefly set forth what my experience of societies has been, so that you may judge of my fitness to appraise the value of what I recommend to your notice. I began of course, like anyone else, with experience of home. Then came school; afterwards a regiment. And following that I had experience in a great variety of societies in India, China and Central Asia. And it was not only that I had opportunities of observing them as a traveller. I had to have practical dealings with them, to work amongst them, sometimes to fight against them, sometimes to have them fighting with me. And I worked—for and with them—not only in ordinary times, but in times of famine, in times of plague and cholera, in times of fierce political agitation. And these societies included very primitive forest tribes of Central India like the Bhils; rough frontier states like Hunza and Chitral, ancient Rajput states like Bundi, the Kashmir State (which through our support is enabled to keep together a large number and variety of lesser states, Hindu-Mohammedan and Buddhist), and finally Tibet. In addition I travelled from one extremity of the Chinese Empire to the other and had political dealings with high Chinese officials. And in all cases I had to act as the British representative, so had to be aware of the sentiment and opinion of my own country. Lastly, I have—though only as an observer—travelled in several European countries, in Africa and in North America.

WITH these opportunities of observation I have got to picture mankind as a whole. In my mind I see man as a whole. But it is not as a crowd, as a kind of general *mêlée*, as we see pebbles on the beach or grains of sand upon the sea-shore that I view mankind. I see

humanity as a *society*, as a building, not as a heap of stones. Nowhere did I see separate individuals unconnected with any society. Nowhere did I see even separate families unconnected with any larger society. The most primitive tribes living in the jungles and hills of Central India never live as separate individuals, nor even as separate families, but always as societies. And from all I hear, it is the same with primitive peoples in other parts of the world. Everywhere there is society. And there probably always has been. It is almost certain that it was from a society, not from a single pair—an Adam and Eve—that man first appeared. So mankind is and probably always has been a society; and is indeed a society of societies of societies in growing extent and increasing complexity.

THIS is the first great fact to be observed.

AND mankind in its turn is not a society aloof and apart by itself. One cannot help observing how closely connected it is with the whole animal and vegetable world. Nor can one disconnect the animal and vegetable world from the physical world. This Sociological Society is only concerned with human societies. But it must needs bear in the back of its mind the consideration that mankind is only a part of an infinite Society, namely the whole Universe. And further that mankind and all the societies of which it is made up are only partial, incomplete societies, interweaving at the edges with other and larger societies and the only true and complete and self-contained Society—a society which is also an Individual—is the whole Universe.

AND whether I observe mankind as a whole or whether I observe the separate societies of which it is made up, everywhere I see gradation, scale—higher and lower. Nowhere do I see level equality. When we talk about the leading nations of the world, this is no empty phrase. There really are leading nations. There are nations which we rightly and properly rank higher than others. France does more for the good of mankind and we therefore rank her higher than Fiji. Similarly we place the Chinese Empire higher than the Bhil tribe. It has more refinement and culture and has exercised a greater influence for good in human affairs. In India this gradation is recognised by the difference in the number of guns accorded to a chief as a salute. Some Chiefs have 21 guns, some 19, 17, 15, 13; and others have no salute at all. The seating of Chiefs in order of precedence at a Durbar is no light matter. The offence which is caused by any mistake is clear evidence of the conviction men have that States do have gradation and are to be ranked as higher and lower. In human society as a whole there clearly is gradation.

AND gradation is equally noticeable among the members of the societies of which mankind is made up. Between the members,

as between the Societies, there is difference of level. In the home, parents and children, elder children and younger, are certainly not considered equal. And when I went to school I found the higher and lower very distinctly emphasised. At a small boys' school a new boy goes up to an old boy and says: "My name is Jones," and the old boy says, "Well, my name is Brown, and I am head of the school, so take that," and gives him a clout over the head and the new boy at once recognises that gradation is a fact he has to reckon with. At a Public School it is the same. There are upper classes and lower classes. Boys are constantly being incited to be as high in their class as they can, and to win their way as soon as possible into a higher class. They are incited also to excel one over the other in running, rowing, football, cricket and other games. The head of the school, the captains of the cricket eleven and the football fifteen are looked up to with awe. Equality I saw nothing of at school.

WHEN I joined my regiment, gradation was even more pronounced. I had my place at the bottom of the list of officers, each of whom had his exact position defined. There might be a dozen lieutenants but each had his place in the order of seniority. And while I was below all the officers, I was above all the non-commissioned officers and men. When I left the regiment and joined the civil administration, it was the same. I had my definite place below some, above others. I was not placed on the same level with anyone else. I found also that on formal State occasions when men from many different services are gathered together, a very definite order of precedence is laid down. A Bishop, a Lieutenant, or the Imperial Bacteriologist, knows precisely how high or how low he is esteemed in the eye of the Sovereign, and in what place he shall proceed to dinner at a State Banquet. It is the same in India as at Buckingham Palace or the Mansion House.

LIKEWISE among all the States—without any exception—with which I have had to deal I have observed the same fact of gradation. The most primitive tribes have their chief, and next to the chief some council of elders. In every native State in India, there are the Chief and Nobles and Ministers, and always great rivalry as to the position to be taken in Durbar. In Tibet it is the same. The monasteries have their Abbots and the monks recognise a distinct gradation among themselves. There is not a single society that I have had to work with where all are considered equal and on the same level.

AND when I come to consider myself personally, I have to acknowledge that I have not the slightest justification for considering myself on the same level with or equal to innumerable fellow-countrymen. In the matter of gardening, I am very inferior to my own gardener. Any ploughman could beat me at ploughing. The youngest clerk in an office would keep accounts better than I could. I unhesitatingly

acknowledge Mr. Lloyd George can beat me in speaking and the Poet Laureate in writing poetry. And even though you have been good enough to make me President of this Sociological Society, I am quite aware that even as a Sociologist I am inferior to many sitting here. In fact I am depressingly unaware of anyone to whom I am equal. Everyone seems to be better than me at something or other. And I cannot see where the equality comes in. I had hoped that before the law I should be equal with my fellows, but I cannot see that even that is the case. If I killed a man I would be hung. But if a lunatic killed a man he would be lodged in a large house and fed free for the rest of his life, while I would have to contribute to the expense of keeping him.

NEITHER in my own case nor in the societies I have observed have I been able to see that all men are equal.

NOR have I been able to see that all men are brothers. I have found that men stand to each other in every degree of relationship from the closest to the remotest. Some men are sisters—and sisters are very different from brothers. Each man has a father and a mother and these again are very different from brothers. So also are wives. Then there are uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, and cousins, some nearly related and some very very distant and very very many times removed. The relationship of a man to his fellows cannot be described in so simple a formula as brotherhood. There is the greatest variety in it. And this variety cannot be ignored. It is both misleading and unscientific to speak of all men as brothers.

NOR have I been able to discover any absolute freedom in any society I have seen. It has always been relative—very relative. Certainly at home, at school and in my profession I found freedom very strictly curtailed. There were very many things we were not allowed to do. And I found the same restrictions in the various other societies I had to deal with in India. It is commonly supposed that primitive people are very free. A barbarian, living in a forest in the open air, with few needs, no clothing and the sky for his roof, must be a delightfully free man, it is supposed. The contrary is the case. He is tied down most rigidly by custom. He dare not go outside it. Even an autocratic ruler like the Chief of Chitral on the Indian frontier who considers he owns his subjects and did not object to firing at a man in the distance for target practice, and who could take one man's wife away and give her to another, complained to me how little he could do that he really wanted to. He would like to have drunk whiskey, but he was prevented by public opinion as he was a Mohammedan. He wanted to wear a light, cool, sun hat like I wore instead of his heavy turban, but he told me he was afraid of the outcry it would raise. Among the Indian States, in Tibet and in China, I found the same. Unrestricted freedom was unknown.

AND when I retired from Government service and came to live in England—the so-called home of freedom—it might be supposed that here at least and at last I myself would be free. But I cannot even walk where I like. If I see a pleasant-looking wood that I would wish to walk in, I find a notice at the entrance to say that if I attempt any such liberty I shall be prosecuted. I cannot even walk on which side of the road or the pavement I like. Sometimes I am told to keep to the right; sometimes to the left. And often when I am driving in a hurry to catch a train, I am held up by a policeman and if I try to be free and drive past him, I am had up in Court and fined £5. I cannot spend as I like the pension which I have earned, for a great part of it is taken away before it ever reaches me. And much as I would like to travel, I find so many calls upon me both public and private that I have to stay at home. And at this moment if I were really free instead of presuming to address you, I would be listening to a paper on "What is a Society?" which is being read this very evening before the Aristotelian Society and which would probably be much more edifying to me than this discourse is to you.

So I have not been able to discover either equality or fraternity or freedom. As far as I have observed, men are neither equal, nor merely brothers, nor entirely free.

ON the other hand, if I do not see any signs of equality among men, nor of any levelling either up or down, what I do see is a growing sense of the dependence of the higher on the lower and of the lower on the higher, and great advantage accruing to the society as a whole from this mutual dependence. And I see this in both mankind as a whole and in the several societies composing mankind. The higher nations, France and the British Empire in particular, do feel a responsibility for the lower. They protect their rights and make efforts to elevate them in the scale of being. And they are beginning to realise that the welfare of mankind as a whole does depend to some extent upon these lower races being contented and prosperous.

AMONGST the members of the higher societies this interdependence of higher and lower is still more marked. Statesmen in most European countries are recognising that only as the masses are kept healthy, well-housed and adequately educated can the nation prosper. Perhaps, too, the masses in some degree appreciate their dependence on good leaders to effect this improvement in their condition.

BUT it is in the smaller societies of which the higher nations are made up that the dependence of higher and lower upon one another—and the advantage to the whole which is to be gained from it—is most noticeable. Take the case of a good regiment. It is an axiom there that an officer must look after his men before himself. And in a cavalry regiment the horses have to be looked after before the men.

A good officer will take infinite care about the food, the equipment, the clothing and even the recreation of his men. He knows that the better they are looked after the better they will be able to fight. And the men, too, know well enough how dependent they are upon the leadership of their officers. A bad officer may lead them to disaster and bring shame and misery upon them. A good officer may lead them to victory, and honour and glory will be heaped upon them.

A LEADER may also infuse such a spirit into a body of men that they will accomplish feats before considered impossible of achievement. The Mount Everest Expedition is an example. If the climbers were to reach the summit of Mount Everest, 29,000 feet, they would have to establish a camp at 27,000; for men without oxygen could not possibly climb more than 2,000 feet in a day. But when the series of expeditions to Mount Everest was started, no human being had attained a higher altitude than 24,600, and then only without a load. Now porters with loads would have to reach an altitude more than 2,000 feet higher. And this year that feat was accomplished. Nepalese porters did carry a camp to 27,000 feet. But it was only done by means of the spirit which the leader of the expedition, first General Bruce and afterwards Colonel Norton, was able to infuse into them. From the best of the hill-men in the neighbourhood of Mount Everest, 40 were selected and formed into a corps of porters. They were paid well, fed well, clothed well, equipped well. But over and above all this, General Bruce was able to interest them in the object of the expedition and instil into them a strong *esprit-de-corps* and a spirit of emulation. They were made to take pride in themselves. After each expedition those who had done well were publicly praised and rewarded and they became great men in their district. The result was that though several lost their lives either from avalanches or from illness, due to exposure, numbers were ready to fill their places. And this year when the extreme climax was reached, they were able to do what was asked of them. But the point I wish to make is that at the final moment it was due to leadership that they were able to accomplish the feat. The number available had been reduced to three or four, and in the first attempt this year even these could not go beyond 25,000 feet. But in the second attempt, Colonel Norton, by a supreme effort of leadership, was just able at the very last moment to induce them to go beyond 25,000 feet camp and on to 27,000 feet. For hundreds and thousands of years these Nepalese and Tibetans had looked up at Mount Everest and never supposed for a moment that it was possible to climb it. And when from here in England we organised these expeditions none of us knew whether it would be possible to climb higher than 25,000. The lack of oxygen in the air might render it impossible to survive at any higher altitude. Now through fine leadership we have carried loads to 27,000 feet, and

without loads have reached 28,000. Thus leadership can enable men to do what without a leader they would never have attempted and never thought possible. And what also has to be noted is that though men in doing this have to undergo fearful strain and run terrible risks they return devoted to their leader and filled with pride in themselves for the rest of their days.

So if there is not equality there is an interdependence of higher and lower which elevates both and benefits the whole.

AND if we cannot legitimately call all men brothers we can at least feel an intense affinity between men. The most primitive men feel this. In a hunt if one of their number is in danger from a tiger others will boldly risk their lives to save him. Among the higher races the feeling is still stronger. If a lascar falls overboard a European will jump into the sea to save him though he has never seen or known the lascar before. A street accident rouses not only curiosity but intensest sympathy. The perennial massacre of Armenians stirs perennial sympathy through Europe and America. And with success as with trouble. The successful flight round the world brings congratulations from every nation. And this affinity is very marked between members of the same class or the same profession in different countries. I have often noticed the strong affinity there is between our own Sovereign and the Chiefs in India. The Sovereign seems to understand and sympathise with and interest himself in a Chief more than an official does. And Chiefs have frequently told me that they are much more attached to the Sovereign than to the Government. The sympathy of the working classes of different countries with one another is equally marked. And it is the same with professions. At Washington I was once talking with an American General about Mexico and he said what a pleasure it was to talk with me because he and I spoke the same language, whereas when he spoke to the politicians they did not understand him. On another occasion when a Russian Colonel acting under the orders of his Government arrested me on the Pamirs, he apologised for his action saying that he and I were military officers and therefore friends, and arresting me was a duty which ought to have been placed in the hands of a police officer. Even in war time there has, up to the recent war, been a strong affinity between opposing military and naval forces. Nelson hated all Frenchmen as such. But he had the highest admiration for the naval commanders he fought. And he prayed that "humanity after victory should be the predominant feature in the British Fleet."

THERE is not actual brotherhood between men, but there is close, intense affinity. And it is this affinity between class and class, profession and profession, which binds nations together in a Society of Nations.

AGAIN, if I see no absolute freedom anywhere, I see that, provided men keep within certain laws, they can achieve what they want better than if they strove to be free of law. If I drive on the left-hand side of the road and stop when the policeman holds up his hand, I shall get to my destination quicker than if there were no regulation of traffic. And further, provided a man devotes himself to promoting the welfare of the society to which he belongs, and identifies his interests with it, he obtains what is worth far more than freedom. He has the support, the encouragement and the devotion of the whole society. He has, it is true, to make sure for himself that his acts as well as his intentions are truly for the good of his society. And he has to convince the society itself that they are not mere whims and idiosyncrasies. But once he has established in his own mind and in the mind of the society that he is furthering its truest and fullest good, there is no end to the devotion the society will give him.

To take an instance close to hand—the late Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. His whole soul was in the Navy and he devoted his whole life to its service. Personal advancement was to him a secondary consideration. The one ruling idea in his life was the good of the Navy. The result was that though he was a stern disciplinarian and was known among the bluejackets as “old ‘ard ‘art” he had the respect and support and devotion of the whole Navy. He had not freedom. He preferred to keep himself within the tight bonds of Naval discipline. But he was able to fulfil his heart’s desire. And he had the satisfaction of feeling that he had made the best of his life. He could not have felt that he had made the Navy perfect. For no man has ever made anything perfect. And no man ever will. Beyond perfection there is always a higher perfection and absolute perfection is never reached. But he did what in him lay for the good of the service to which he belonged. And by so doing he earned a satisfaction for his soul which freedom alone—even if he could have had it—would never have given.

GATHERING together the results so far reached, I may say then that I have come to the conclusion that in the societies I have observed there is neither liberty, equality nor fraternity, but that there *is* what is better than these. If there is no absolute liberty there is scope and encouragement in working for the ends of the society. If there is no equality there is a mutual dependence of higher and lower on one another which raises the capacity of both and makes them better able to achieve the society’s ends. And if brotherhood does not accurately describe the relationship between men there is affinity of an intensity greater far than is implied in brotherhood.

AND if in the best societies there is strong affinity between the members ; if the higher interest themselves in the welfare of the lower and the

lower are loyal to their leaders and through this mutual dependence the society is able to achieve a higher end than without it would be possible; and if the members have no thought but the good of the society; then we have a good illustration of what a true sense of society means. We have here sociality as well as individuality. If the society is small we call the sociality "*esprit-de-corps*." If the society is a country we call it patriotism. If the society is mankind, we call it humanity. And if the society is the Universe, we call it religion.

BUT I would not have you think that this sense of society is only in the individual members who compose the society. It is also in the society itself. We not only love our home, our home loves us. We not only love our regiment; our regiment loves us. We not only love our country; our country loves us. We not only love God; God loves us. The love is reciprocal. The society honours those who serve it well. Every country has rewarded the great commanders of its armies in the late war. And in every village in every country are memorials to those who have fallen.

I TRUST you will now have some idea of what I mean when I speak of a sense of society. But I may make a few additional observations in order to make the idea clearer. This *esprit-de-corps*, this spirit of sociality, is something different and something more than ordinary altruism. It is not a matter of helping one another, or of putting another individual's interest before your own, as a mother does for her child. Nor can it accurately be described as selflessness or unselfishness, for the individual puts his whole self into the society. Sir Arthur Wilson, though he devoted his life to the Navy, was very much himself. And it is something different from comradeship though it includes it. The members of the ship's company are true comrades, but only because of their common devotion to the ship. It is the devotion to the ship that combines them together as comrades, not comradeship which makes them devoted to the ship. What this spirit is can best be exemplified by a saying they have in the Navy: "Ship before self." Whatever your private interests are they must give way for the good of the ship. Your own life must go for the ship's. On the other hand the ship, through the commander, looks after the welfare of each individual. And if it is a matter of the ship going down, he is the last to leave it. The individuals think of the ship and the ship thinks of the individuals. This is the true *esprit-de-corps*.

THE same spirit in another form was displayed in this year's Mount Everest Expedition. Norton, the leader of the expedition, was willing and ready to be one of the pair to be chosen from a party of twelve who would make the actual attempt to reach the summit. And as

leader he might have chosen himself. The honour and glory would go to the pair who reached the summit while the leader who organised the whole attempt and those who supported the final climbers and on whose shoulders they would reach the summit might hardly be remembered. Yet Norton did not selfishly exercise the right. He left it to Mallory and Somervell (a doctor) to decide, when he was on the mountain and they could see how he was standing the strain, whether he was fit enough to be one of the storming party. And when it was decided that he was perfectly fit, even then he gave two others the first chance of securing the great prize. In every member of the expedition there was the same spirit. The object was to reach the summit of the mountain. All personal considerations must give way before that. Only the pair who at the critical moment were in the fittest state to reach it should be allowed to make the attempt. The rest must sacrifice themselves for those two—must make corpses of themselves as they expressed it—so as to give the chosen pair the best chance of reaching the summit.

AND here we must note that the individual in devoting himself to his society is thereby enabled really to be himself. In losing himself he finds himself. He can be in the society what he could never be by himself. For the society in order to achieve its end forces him and helps and encourages him to put forth his utmost. No individual by himself could climb Mount Everest. But in an expedition anyone who is able and willing to climb is assisted and encouraged and enabled to accomplish what his heart is most set on. And in a concert each member of the orchestra plays his part and contributes to the whole ; yet the whole at special moments plays so as to bring out in a telling climax some special singer or violinist, and he sings or he plays with an effect that alone he could never have produced.

So, if the individual serves the society, the society brings out the individual—and more particularly brings out the special individual who can best help the society to achieve its ends or can best voice what it wishes to express. In a fleet or an army that individual will be the commander. In a climbing expedition it will be the climber who is in fittest condition when the critical moment is reached. In an orchestra it will be now this instrumentalist and now that as the movement requires.

THUS only through society can the best individuals be their best, and if there is one individual who is the very soul of the society to which he belongs, who most fully embodies in himself, or who voices or can best carry out the purpose for which the society exists, it will be this one whom the society in its turn will encourage and bring to the front and elevate into a position where he can make his influence felt at its fullest.

ANOTHER characteristic of *esprit-de-corps* has to be observed. Sailors put ship before self. Everest climbers put reaching the summit before personal interest. But in both cases—and in all cases of genuine *esprit-de-corps*—the individual has also in the back of his mind the good of larger and larger societies in ever widening circles around him. The Everest climber has the good of the expedition at heart, but he also thinks of the credit success will bring his country. He looks further still. He thinks of the value it will be to mankind as a whole; how it will show men they are capable of doing more than they thought; how it will exalt the spirit of man and encourage him to undertake tasks he had not attempted before through a meagre sense of his own capacities. And sailors, when they put ship before self, also mean that the ship should serve the fleet and that the fleet should serve the country. And, as Nelson's prayer before Trafalgar shows, they go a step further still. "May the Great God I worship," he writes, "grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory." The great commander had in view the good of Europe in general as well as the good of his own country. The service his fleet rendered his country he hoped would be for the good of mankind.

THOSE who have an *esprit-de-corps* for a small society have also in mind the good of wider and wider societies in which their lesser society is included. But ultimately—and here again we see reciprocity—the good of the wider will dominate and determine the good of the lesser. Patriotism will determine the *esprit-de-corps* of the ship. And humanity will determine patriotism. It is from love of country that members of a ship's company put ship before self. And it is because they are proud of the part their country plays in the world that they love their country. The more glorious part she plays in world affairs, the deeper they love her.

So the individual, however vaguely, has nevertheless always in regard the good of society after society in widening circles to which he belongs, and reciprocally this good of the larger society determines his loyalty to the lesser. And now I reach a peculiarly important point to which I would venture to invite your special attention. The lesser societies must necessarily be animated by the spirit of the larger societies from which they spring. But finally all will be dominated by the spirit of the one and only self-contained society which includes all these societies, and from which every society is eventually derived, namely, the Universe as a whole. The smallest society and each individual member of it must in some degree be animated by the spirit of the Universe. The Universal spirit must ultimately determine one's action.

THE home, the regiment, the profession—all these lesser societies spring from one's country and must be animated by its spirit and act in accordance with it. English homes are inspired with the spirit of

England ; French homes with the spirit of France. English regiments are imbued with the dogged, steadfast spirit of England ; French regiments with the dash and *élan* of France. Then, as we take a wider sweep, all nations have sprung from mankind as a whole and must be animated by the human spirit. France and England and other countries are in varying degrees animated by the spirit of humanity and act in accordance with it. In common with tigers they have the animal spirit in them. But on the whole they act as human beings and not as tigers.

AND mankind as a whole has sprung from the Universe and must therefore be animated by its Spirit and act in accordance with it. The Universal Spirit must be the controlling and determining factor in the activities of mankind and therefore of each country and therefore of each individual of each society. And this it was that Nelson felt in that tense moment before he went into action at Trafalgar. He thought of his fleet, he thought of his country, he thought of Europe in general, he thought of humanity. But he also felt his dependence on that Great Spirit which animates, controls and directs the world.

So while the individual gives himself for his home, his country, mankind, he is also imbued with the Spirit of the Universe and impelled to act in accordance with it. But just as there are Englishmen who have only a paltry sense of the spirit of England and act therefore in a luke-warm way, while there are others who are burning with it and act with power and effect, so there are men who have only the faintest sense of the Universal Spirit and who therefore act in a tame and timid way, while there are others, and in especial a rare few, who have the very acutest sense of this Great Spirit—or as some would express it, of the presence of God in the world—and acting in accordance with it infuse a divine life and exert a commanding influence in each society to which they belong, sharpening, quickening, refining and elevating its activities and shaping them towards the Universal End.

IT is this sense of society, this aliveness to the spirit of society—and of society in all its forms—which finds its expression in *esprit-de-corps*, patriotism, humanity, all infused by religion, that is to my mind the most valuable thing I observed in those societies of which I have had practical experience. And these brief remarks upon it I submit for your critical consideration. For I believe that it may turn out that the more we sociologists are imbued with the spirit of sociality, the better able we shall be to enter into the spirit of human society and of the innumerable societies and societies of societies of which it is built up, and the better able therefore we shall be to understand them, and so fulfil the purpose of our own Society.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS :* by J. Lionel Tayler.

IN the first of these articles, published in the last issue of this REVIEW, a simple but, if true, very important claim was made in regard to educational theory and practice. It was there stated that while the theory of education assumed that wise living (and, as an ideal, all human living) ought to be for educational ends, yet the educational practice of all schools and colleges, with very few exceptions, was that education was not for itself but for the enhancement of a great game of life. But if one sought for any educational theory to explain the rationale of this game it was found that the theory was as completely lacking as was the practical teaching for the cultural educational ideal. Thus cultural educational theory had no practice built upon it. And the sporting or gaming practice of life had no theoretical foundations. What seemed to be wanted therefore was a superstructure of true cultural practice for existing cultural theory and a foundational theory for the game-view of human life. It was maintained that two ways of looking at our life were clearly visible, (1) life could be for education on the one hand, or (2) education on the other could be merely to enhance healthy zestful experience and make life more sensitively and sensually intense. The latter aspect was at least a hundred or more times as popular as the former and in all probability would remain throughout human history as the more popular appeal, it needed therefore to have an ideal provided for its practice.† The student's mind on the contrary required a practice to enable him to carry out into life his existing theory. It was suggested that if these two types of mind had the doors of opportunity healthily opened to them social life would be greatly purified and enriched.

IN this article the writer wishes to show that his claim is supported by any fair-minded study of the most general facts of life, as the whole superstructure of society reveals the difficulty of this unsatisfactory educational compromise.

LOOKED at culturally the ordinary man's or woman's life is an obvious and colossal failure. Not only is it true that post-graduate studies (if they are sincerely cultural and not of merely monetary significance) are of the utmost rarity, probably less than one per cent. of the total adult population, but any study of the immense preponderance of fiction in book publishers' and library catalogues; of what is topical in the press; of what is liked on gramophone records and of what is desired on the stage, makes it certain that what the main body of public

* See SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1924, for the previous paper.

† The failure to provide for the healthy ideal accounts for a large part of the abuses of sensationalism, sensuality, and nausea at life, which are so characteristic of all human eras and our own in particular.

opinion wants is not culture. And the appalling dullness of later middle life and old age in most human beings, to say nothing of the mental deteriorations associated with dotage and senility, confirm this impression. It is most unlikely that a drift and weight so tremendous against culture, which has been manifested throughout human development, will be turned to enforce it. But it is readily believable that this drift might be better directed in its own direction.

It is not less certain that genius has been persecuted in every age known to history. It therefore seems probable that the rarer culture-loving mind and the more common mind which expects life to be played as a great game would each benefit by having their different positions mutually understood. What is however difficult to explain is why this misunderstanding and confusion of the two life aims has lasted so long.

FAIRLY considered all views of life reveal the necessity for recognising two complete theories and two practices *as alternative modes of living*. It is very evident, for instance, that if cultural ideals had prevailed for the many different occupations which have arisen, the extremes of wealth and poverty would not exist. There would be in the world much wider diversities of habit and much less force of fashion but also remuneration for work would be more equalised, as the differences between different student ideals would seldom be more between low and high requirements than would be covered by a range of incomes whose maximum divergencies would hardly exceed a hundred pounds. Another theory than that of culture is required to explain the very wide divergencies of distribution of wealth manifested in all countries of the world as these advance in power. That other theory is that life is a game of rewards, rivalry and competition, and that the zest of living comes when we recognise this and play for big stakes.

BUT if we look more closely at the tremendous differences of social status we see that poverty and wealth are only partly actual and partly relative terms. What is expected from people in more wealthy situations often eats up the larger income quite as surely as the lesser calls made on the less wealthy with their smaller salaries and wages. And while it is true that a small really opulent section exists, it is only partly true for the great majority that the divergencies of rank are as great as they appear. The margin of avaiably earned money beyond what is required for successful social upkeep is much less unequal than gross wages, salaries and stipends suggest. But what is certain is that the basis of remuneration is not cultural.

ONCE again to take the subject of representation. Whatever else the claim of "one person one vote" signifies it does not mean any kind of intellectual justification. It has been pointed out again and again that every aspect of this representative field is almost anti-intellectual.

(1) THERE is no relation between cultural capacity and voting power, nor is there even the most elementary test of social knowledge, and, as a fact, all those who are not certifiably insane, have equal opportunities and weight as voters, and this is granted though it is well known that there are large numbers of relatively feeble-minded men and women in the world who are not certified because they are just beyond the stage of social incapacity, while still larger numbers are really insane having one or more "bees in their bonnets" but are what are called harmless eccentrics or lunatics. (2) What is called "nursing a constituency" does not mean, and never has meant, attempting to educate it; the nursing process is devoted to one object, that of popularity. (3) The electioneering campaign itself is almost always a frank appeal to personal interests and prejudices, is never non-party, and could not succeed if it were really disinterested and dispassionate, and the campaign is always too short to have any educational value, even if study, and not excitement, were the end in view. The arousing of party feeling (supported by much very flimsy sophistry, seasoned with a "bit of fun" and some real good nature, so that the feeling aroused shall not be anarchic) seems to be the real objective. (4) Lastly, the candidates are never expected to be experts or even to have some acquaintance with the subjects about which they speak. No training is given them, no tests imposed and they are merely supposed, in theory, to be loyal to two impossible ideals, to vote for what their constituencies want and at the same time to support the political parties to which they severally belong. There is no trace of real culture in these attitudes nor is there any likelihood that there ever will be. It is also true that as electioneering methods tend to be better understood there is a very small class of real students who tend to be increasingly disgusted and abstain from voting.

Thus in education and in politics and indeed in all aspects of social life there would seem to be a very small minority who would make the end of life to be that of genuine culture, while there is a very large majority who would use knowledge only as a means of defining the rules and adding to the skill of the players in a game of life and who believe in a far more comprehensive manner than any real scholar does that "much study is a weariness of the flesh." Here are two views of life, which need not be antagonistic if each has its share in human society, (1) life may be for education, or (2) education may be for life; but though society needs both types one individual man or woman cannot accept both in his or her personal life practice, but must choose which of the two aims he or she will follow, nor can marriages be happily made between individuals of different life ideals.

IF this simple and obvious recognition of a fundamental difference between the temperaments of the few and the many be allowed, one must recognise that society is really governed by (1) emotional forces

which in healthy synthesis achieve intellectual ends and (2) minority cultural influences of the few which indirectly (not directly) influence the more directly governing feelings of the many. *The acceptance of this very obvious position does however mean that education, industry, economics and politics as well as the including science of sociology must be studied from a much wider platform or view-point than the narrow one of simple logical rationalism.*

It is not accident that Comte, Lewes and Spencer all came, towards the close of their lives, to the belief that they had under-estimated the strength of feeling in its capacity to direct social conditions, nor is it accident that Socrates, Buddha and Christ, the world's greatest religious teachers all sought, from different approaches, to subordinate the lower but more powerful desires of the human mind. But it will be said "this view of men's actions, simple though it may be, yet makes the social student's task unpleasantly difficult. If one has to investigate a given *cultural* outlook this is a feasible, though often a very difficult, proposition, but if one has to study *how* the prejudices of most men and women by complex interactions work out unexpected results, because social laws of Nature give *general* significance to what is *individually* erratic and through these laws society develops, are we not faced with ideas so new that all political and social positions are in danger of being thrown into confusion?"

To the reader who thus raises this objection the writer would urge this reply. The practice of politics like the practice of education, has always been emotional, and both practices will be little changed by a new outlook, but what is wanted are theories of education and politics which will explain these at present inconsistent tendencies. The new views will not confuse but explain human activities when the majority of human beings come to see themselves as reasoning but not reasonable men and women. The writer will return to this final consideration in his next paper.

J. LIONEL TAYLER.

TOWARDS A THEORY OF SACRIFICE: by Victor Branford.

I.

THERE is before us an engraved copy of a Turner etching. In the foreground, trees and a river; at various distances a few buildings; and above, a still sky flecked with lighted clouds. The scene is saturated with light and peace. The painter expresses a profound harmony, such as often declares itself in scenes like this. The picture is a record equally of fact, a definite landscape; and of "values," an intimation of felicity. A mastery of detail, and the expression of a transcendent harmony are here inseparable. For without these definite commonplace objects truly related to one another, yet each yielding its utmost meaning and significance, the artist could neither receive nor impart this exalted vision.

IN the same way, every formed consciousness is an habitual picture wherein a little world of facts, impressions, memories, hopes, thoughts, impulses, aspirations, imagery, is composed under the influence of some dominant harmony, or scheme of life-values. It is a vision of life, having something of the unity of a work of art. At its best and happiest, it stands an ordered unity composed from the jumbled material of our inner life. There is an inner distraction from which each one of us suffers, whether or not we be conscious of the associated disharmony of mind. For most of us the thought-stream pours through our mind with a horrid turbulence. Our world-within is no haven of tranquility, but rather an ill-working gear case vibrant with what William James called a "big, buzzing, booming confusion."

WHENCE comes this mental disturbance? There are doubtless many sources. To begin with, there is the unresolved conflict exposed by the psycho-analyst's uncanny scalpel. It dissects out and discloses an unending strife of animal impulses and selfish desires in perpetual combat with social propensities and altruistic emotions. This source of inner disharmony, long familiar to the theologian, and to-day emphasised by the psycho-analyst, has, by both, been inadequately related, at least in detail, to the human environment. Suppose it be the unlovely scenes, disorderly milieu, alluring temptations, distracting trivialities, of environing circumstance, that awaken, sustain and fix the Caliban within us. Working on that supposition the social analyst complements and supplements the psycho-analyst. Together they make it plain that so long as we let things go on as at present, these two sources of derangement and perplexity, outer and inner, are, and will remain, entangled in one expanding web of corruption. The two factors act together in lowering the worth of such vision of life as we can compass.

WITHIN this cramping limitation, we fashion our vision of life and civilisation. It depends partly on the rank of the harmony which

it may choose for its home, and partly on grip and concentration in ordering masses and details into the luminous unity of the rhythm. In proportion as a man attains personality, or the unity characteristic of spirit, he identifies himself with a great, it may be a supreme, harmony, and gains mastery over detail, selecting, rejecting and valuing with a single view to unity in expression and fulfilment. Life is woven of those two elements of its own vital art, inspiration and technique, a harmony and its disciplined elucidation out of confused materials and impulses.

THE same is true of cities and towns, also of periods, cultures, institutions, professions and the like; each expresses, through all its outward detail, some definite inward spirit, which may be as clear to us as the character of a friend, and is of the same nature, since each presents a scheme of facts and values. Our social environment has at all times something of this pictorial quality; its detail expresses a system of chosen values, a cult of some kind, so that even the most secular mind must interpret it in terms of worship. All our considerations of social affairs are, whether we know it or not, based on a scheme or theory of worship, or spiritual valuation; and if we are to deal effectively with the renewal of any particular region, city, village, home, or individual life, it can only be done by the demonstration of what things are actually sacred, and merit, and will reward, devotion. The individual is constantly formed by, and is constantly forming, his social environment; together they form the real unity for study and for effort. One tradition has been based on the idea of saving or renewing the individual. Another has been based on the idea of reforming his environment. Each of these has suffered from its abstract character. We must rise above these two abstractions to the idea of an indissoluble unity of personality and community with each other and with environment and tradition, and of the renewal or regeneration of the whole by the "sacring" of every one of its vital elements. Personality is chiefly formed by the devotion which an inner vision arouses; and community by the truth, range and nobility of personal visions. The spiritual picture encompassed in the vision that kindles personality is a unity in duality, like the single picture given in the mind from the double imagery supplied to the brain by our two eyes. But the cerebral or mental picture is the spontaneous recombination of a natural unity dissevered by the operation of our nervous system. On the other hand, the spiritual picture has to be very deliberately composed by a life-long apprenticeship to the art of Seership. The human task is to *work at this spiritual picture*, to make it true to all facts and true to the highest values, to give it the real pictorial character of one luminous, transcendent, harmony inspiring all the detail, and to set it forth in life and home, city, region, nation and the world. The central point on which we have to work like good

craftsmen is this inward picture. And the clue to its composition is a welding of dominant life-values, or WORSHIP, with the relevant facts and relations, or KNOWLEDGE.

THESE two factors in personal and social life have too much been entertained as independent systems, admitting only of a vague and unstable compromise. Instead, they must be frankly reunited before we can emerge from the present phase of intellectual bewilderment, moral aridity, and social confusion. We must establish a life which shall pursue to the uttermost both knowledge and worship, and shall pursue them both as one.

As is always the case, their difference, and not their identity, comes first to the eye. Knowledge is concerned with the relations of things, and its practical result is efficiency, and mastery over the conditions of human life. Worship, on the other hand, is concerned with the sacredness of things; that is to say, with their worth in relation to a developing spiritual harmony, or militant peace of mind, resonant through classes and nations. The practical result of worship is dedication or sacrifice; the treatment of things not as ours to do what we like with, but as possessed by a commanding harmony, and thus as belonging to our true home, and as means toward it. So far as knowledge is concerned, we are in a position of ever-growing mastery and possession; but so far as worship is concerned we are in the position of children, confiding and seeking beyond what we know, and led by faith and hope and love, though always established by the knowledge which follows close behind.

BUT the two activities, though apparently so different, are always associated. Every life seeks a peace of some kind, although it may be a poor one, and is so far a life of worship; whether its deity be self, money, power, the State, truth, beauty, home, country, humanity, or whatever it may be. Men find their end in these and other worships, and make great sacrifices to them, and so achieve some kind of satisfaction, which of course may be wretched and unstable, or comparatively noble, fruitful and secure. Every such devotion creates its own coherent system of ideas and habits, its formulæ of relevant facts and values, and so builds a little edifice of knowledge, or it may be, a well-founded system. Worship is the great builder of knowledge. But knowledge equally determines worship; for men only worship what they know, or believe they know. The two activities are inseparable functions of one life, complementary elements in one picture, and can only be developed so.

WHAT, then, of the apparent discrepancy between the aims of knowledge, and those of the spiritual valuation we call worship? There is, in fact, in the run of life, no such discrepancy. Economics, for example, selects and interprets all relevant facts and relations, in the light of a dominant value, conceived to be ultimate: *i.e.*, in the light

of an object of worship. This "science" was first dominated by the worship of material wealth. The "economic laws" which it formulated at that stage were indeed repugnant to any higher value than brute wealth; the economic practice which it sanctioned was void of grace and pity; but so far from being unsympathetic to devotion, the theory was a dogmatic expression of the cult of Mammon. But a deeper scheme of values presently began to transform the economic system and give it new life. The nobler worship of nature and of humanity, which in point of historic fact were renewing themselves at the same moment that saw the rise of economic science, brought, in course of time, a new range and fervour of insight and new methods of research. The mind became less and less inclined to find rest in the thought of immense resources and accumulations, and increasingly went out to the contemplation of family life and civic well-being, and gathered its facts and worked at its picture accordingly. And the progress does not end here. The further development of worship towards its inevitable end—the creative spiritual harmony—continues, however slowly, to transform the body of economic knowledge, remaking it into something growing ever more concrete, beneficent, scientific, and therefore really useful. As in this case, so in others, science has risen like a tide from level to level, recapitulating the emergence of spirit from material conditions and simply organic ones. Thus it gave an account of the conditions of physical health and well-being, before it entered on the great field of sanity which now promises so much; and this passes upward without a more than intermittent break to the region of sanctity, which is the higher power of sanity. The science which has taught the conditions of the healthy body and then of the sane mind, will not stop short of the conditions of the good life and of the noble people. And when it floods that region, much as it will gain from traditional religion, it will have as much to give. For the services of knowledge and worship are reciprocal. True worship dissolves prejudiced theory, as much as true knowledge dissolves unworthy worship. The ideals of truth, beauty, freedom, sanity and the like are far more one than they are diverse; and the recognition of this is the first step in the much needed re-integration of personality, of culture, and of society. These ideals are modes of the changeless harmony which inspires all life, in which also the spirit finds its exalted and militant peace, that which has been called "the peace of God." And though that ideal peace passeth understanding we are called imperatively by an inner voice to persist in quest of it.

II.

REINTEGRATION is the urgent need, simplicity of vision within myself, and oneness-in-variety of vision with my fellows; and so, personal and social peace and fruitfulness. Each one of us has his vision of life; but its several views are often incoherent in themselves, and are

always too much restricted, being narrow in knowledge and confused in worship ; so that their effect is to separate rather than to unite. We have to push on from one stage of awareness to another, in progressive steps towards the quality of universality in respect both of knowledge and of values, so that our several visions, services and interests, may increasingly attain to the inward organic unity of a living society. What, then, is the way of integration ? To say that there is a way of science and a way of sanctity, and that these two paths must both be trodden, is not enough, even if it be shown in detail how the two journeys may be made. The quest of life is for one way which is *the way*.

Is it not an enlarging effort to find and follow this central way of life, that distinguishes the "world-religions," marking them off from those which lag at primitive or tribal stages of culture ? In the Buddhist Path of Ennoblement, you see this differential aspect with unusual clearness, because there so fully divested of bewildering survivals from animistic belief and magical practice. To "open the eyes," and bestow the "understanding which leads to peace, to insight, to the higher wisdom," is the end of the Buddha's Noble Way. And not only in Buddhism, but also in each of the higher religions from China to ancient Greece, and perhaps even to Celtic Britain, the same golden thread runs through a web of coarse fibre. The Science of Religion awaits a comparative study of these golden threads, each viewed in relation to the texture of its own environment and tradition. Meantime there is, for us of the Western world, the mediæval peak of religious attainment, to stand at once as signpost and danger signal.

SEARCH then the mediæval experiment in the evocation of personality and the building of community. Scrutinise its inward intention no less than its outward performance. You find the days when the old cathedral was erected, and science was one with sanctity, were the days of the dedicated life. The order of chivalry quite consciously and with the definiteness of system, aimed to evoke ideals of honour, modesty and mercy. Similarly it sought, in intention if not constantly in fact, to inspire a noble regard for womanhood, and championship of the poor and oppressed. The true knight was not his own man. The putative scheme of his life was one of discipline, renunciation and responsibility ; a life of conscious dedication to the Social Body of which chivalry was an organic part. Learning and education were, if we take them at the mediæval high-water mark, in the hands of men who submitted themselves to an ordered discipline of dedicated life, whose rule of obedience and self-denial expressed a vital membership of the same Body. The convent offered lives of intercession, not for itself but for the family of mankind, and not as its own act, but vicariously for the whole people. The industrial guild was conceived and built up on a plan that aimed to express the vital relation of its

craft to the city-community ; for while it sought the benefit of the workers, it stood also for the dignity of the industry, and for service of the public ; so that these labours, at the heyday of their achievement, were, in form and intention, and to no small extent in substance also, dedicated, and bore the same character of discipline and responsibility. It was an age of confraternities, all in their various ways imbued with an avowed intention towards conscious spiritual membership of one living society, and so of one another. Thus, the means were given, implied at least in purpose and polity, by which every order of the people, and every occupation, might become aware of a specific sacredness, as performing its own honourable function in a vital structure which, taken at its best, was moved by an impulse felt to be both human and divine. Under these conditions, society, viewed at its growing point, was on the way to become inwardly organised, in a sense which later generations seemed, for the time, to have forgotten ; and the mode of this organisation was Dedication.

MAY not the endeavour towards a Dedicated Life, which is the open secret of the living cathedral and its city-community, also afford a main clue to the Visioning of the Future ? If so, then the problem of to-day may be stated as a renewal of that spiritual endeavour, on our modern spiral of rising knowledge and mastery. It is for the future to mobilise these forces for campaigns of a militant peace inspired by desire for organic social vitality, and moved by well-drawn plans to achieve it. And this ordered activity of dedicated lives will be schemed on no vague lines of general policy, but will proceed as in the march of armies, village by village, town by town, city by city. And in the operations of a militant peace the social process will run with the life process, and not against it as in the end does war, or athwart it, as too often in "business enterprise."

LET us pause to explore more fully the concept of a "dedicated life." Its foundations lie deep in the nature of things. We often hear of the "mystery" of organic life. The truth in this refers to the fact that life is not the mere sum or resultant of the physical changes which subserve it, but itself strives to inspire and dominate these, and increasingly learns the conditions of successful striving. A living thing is a complex system of relations which, though it may be explored by analysis, nevertheless is also something more, of a kind which analysis can never exhaust. This "something more" is the specific dominant harmony latent in, and evocable from, these relations ; and in this harmony lies the so-called mystery. But dominant harmony of this kind characterises all life, as latency or actuality. It shows itself in the life of instinct, and again of course more explicitly in the life of thought and will ; it comes out very clearly in social life, in works of art, and pre-eminently in the life of faith and sanctity. Throughout the whole realm of life and spirit, we find what artists

call "form" dominating material, or the end inspiring the means. In every vital or ideal system, the whole is *somehow* and in some degree present in each part. This somehow has been the subject of endless discussion in theology, logic, metaphysics, æsthetics, ethics, psychology, and not least, in biology. It is a matter in which no finality can ever be achieved, because the mystery however deeply analysed will doubtless ever leave an ultimate; a potential harmony of life is the beginning and an attained peace the end. But without postulating any hypothesis we may use Spenser's couplet to express a quality of life recognised in all the life-sciences from biology to theology:

"For of the soule the bodie form doth take:
For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make."

BUT at one point we have a clear though narrow view into the nature of the "mystery." As we see light only within the range of the spectrum, though the scale of vibrations extends far above and below these limits, so this universal principle of dominant harmony, which corresponds, as it were, to the inner side of nature, is directly perceptible only within the range of its activity in our own conscious existence. There it wears the aspect of love, sacrifice and dedication. As we cannot say that rays outside the range of the spectrum are coloured, nor even that they are light, so we cannot say that this creative harmony, except in our own consciousness, has precisely the character of love and sacrifice. But there is obviously in each case an identity which is more important than the difference; and we are justified in saying that the harmony which makes the wonder of the beech or pine has in it something of the spiritual. Indeed, nature wears that character on its face. The flower's beauty is the intimation of some inward loveliness.

ALL the inspirations of religion arise from the universal and unmistakable fact of creative harmony, and from our discord or peace with it. Perception of, and obedience to, this harmony make the life of dedication, which in its higher phase becomes the life of sanctity, wherein at its richest all is harmony, rising at times to the mystic moment of a seemingly realised perfection. This life of dedication is the architectonic principle of society. Just as a harmony unites the cells of the growing beech to build that symphony of power and grace in which at last it stands, so a spiritual harmony, inspiring a people and expressed in their desires, brings into being the wonderful societies which from time to time have glorified our race. To be sure, such attainments are denied by the cynics of life and the satirists of history. But before yielding to these temptations of scepticism, let the enquirer look into the home of any good mother, and observe well its creative deeds. The sources of its potent harmony are fairly patent. And although we do not know how "form" is imparted to the growing tree, yet we know that as women make the home, so men become

builders of civilisation through the inward music of love and sacrifice. We also know what social existence is like when the music has departed and the soul is quenched. We see it all round us—a welter of atomic interests ; a senseless conflict of partisan groups ; a chaos of misunderstanding ; personality degraded, and society in dissolution. It is human life desecrated ; and on the way to corruption, because of its trivialities, hypocrisies, its cynicisms, its lack of the sense and practice of sacredness.

THIS sense of the sacred is the saving element in individual and in people ; it is the source both of personal dignity and of vital community. Its opposite is the hell of vandalism, separation and brutality. Three things rise or fall together—the realisation of sacredness, the ennoblement of personality, and the life of community. These react on one another continually, but the first is the indispensable means to the others. In the supreme art of making man, or the cultivation of personality and community, the essential activity is the mystic joyousness of sacrifice, or making sacred. This “sacring,” or lifting up of life, does not mean some fantastic or sentimental addition to an actually commonplace existence, but the disciplined evocation of the incalculable spiritual wealth which is always present in the conditions of our life. Sacredness is the deepest element in the interplay of life and things ; we cannot know them truly, nor deal with them propitiously, except in view of their value to spirit. Who can know anything about labour, or property, or government, and their true place in life and society, unless he knows first their value to spiritual fulfilment ? Who is fitted to plan for the city, unless he will strive to make it a sacred city, and so a home for the souls of men ? Or what profane person can understand anything of the spirit of woman or child ?

THE recurrent tragedy of religious systems comes from man's tendency to misuse, or but half use, the working tool of evocation. The instrument, designed by an immemorial tradition, for making sacred is two edged. We remember the renunciation involved in sacrifice, its blunter edge ; we too easily forget the spiritual intention of the process, its finer edge ; and so fail to enjoy the harvest of exalted life reaped by this sickle of the soul. Sacrifice has always the intention of peace or harmony with the object of worship. A man gives away something, which has been his to use freely as he liked, to some system of harmony which he thereby acknowledges as his end. If to the supreme harmony we fondly call “ultimate,” it is an act of well founded worship. If to a lower or partial harmony, it is still an act of worship, though of a fallacious or illusory kind, because that lower system is not adequate to his nature, so that his peace will be incomplete or precarious. In either case, the object is no longer his, to do what he likes with. It is sacred, and is guarded from profane uses, being charged with a higher because symbolic value.

ONE who by repeated sacrifice, practised towards habitual perfection, is at last depleted of everything, and has no life which he can call his own, has attained that radiance of serenity which is the insignia of complete personality. He is also the essence of community, because self-will is the single destroyer both of personality and of community. He has reached the highest rank of nobility, because in him the spirit of harmony can do its creative work unhindered. He has poetised not this nor that but the whole of existence. He enjoys, according to his capacity, the supreme picture, in which truth, beauty, freedom and all other aspirations and graces are one—a light saturating every detail of life. He has peace in himself, peace with all men, with all events, with all nature; for the spirit of militant peace is one, and is the deepest and loftiest harmony. He is moved by a vision of life on the way to fulfilment, as of old on their journey to the Promised Land were the Israelites by flame of fire in desert nights. Each morning is he heartened afresh for the day's work by impassioned union of his own day-dreaming impulse with the social ideal. He knows the wide ambit of truth in the poet's saying of his heavenly love:

"She who doth imparadise my mind."

The poet lives in the contemplation of a certain harmony. So does the man of science. So does the philosopher. So does the statesman or civic reformer. But each of these harmonies, each picture, is incomplete, and is felt and known to be so. The more each is elaborated, the more obstinate and baffling do its limitations become, and the more evident the inherent fallacy of its abstraction from life. We turn from one picture to another, in vain search for the unity demanded by life and spirit, thought and practice, all working together. There is only one way to renew these several pictures so as to liberate each from its present limitations. This is by *living* a higher harmony than any of them, for all these pictures are but aspects of life. We shall never attain their unity by juxtaposition of their differences; but we may always do so by a new life, a re-birth, from which each of these shall continually renew itself as a special function. But the deepest, in a sense the only, vital harmony is the gladdening life of sacrifice, or making sacred.

III.

THERE are two opposite poles of thought and conduct, viz., sacrifice and profanation; and as all human good, it would seem, comes from the one, so does all moral evil issue from the other, or so it appears. Not now by symbolic rites alone, nor only by a purified disposition, but by a revolution in thought and practice, we have to discover again the sacred character of life's latencies, and how to evoke and develop them. Open to all of us is a vocation of discovery which is also a discovery of evocation. This vocation of discovery and realisation has equally the practical, scientific and religious character. It is

widely at work in many sporadic forms, and marks a new social vitality stirring below decay and devastation. But it is still largely unconscious of its own nature and destiny; it has not yet found its power, nor even its appropriate methods. It is more than ever desirable that its aim should be defined, and its forces organised, at a time when antique standards and institutions are losing their hold, for the reason that they have for the time lost effective touch with the means of making life sacred, which, in order to become effective, must be at once community and personal. In the transitional unsettlement (which had begun long before the war), there is little hope in a mere calling back to codes and institutions which, by their desecrations, have gone far to alienate the conscience of mankind. The prime and pressing thing to do is to seek the guidance of evolutionary tendencies and ends, and with every light that history and science can give us, to make every detail of life transparent to a great harmony.

FROM this point, of course, the universal field of human activity might be surveyed. Here we can only enumerate a few movements in recent and current thought and estimation, as indications of a renewed perception of the religious value of matters which had erroneously lost that character. They illustrate a principle which will doubtless be more and more applied systematically to the renewal of life individual and social, and the reconstruction of environment, urban and rural.

THE sense of the sacredness of Nature, as containing the latency of spirit and an impulse to the spiritual quest, is in contrast with a view long dominant, which still regards spirit as irreconcilably at war with nature. But assuredly the unity-in-variety of Man and Nature is the prime postulate of modern science. How, on this assumption, the flowering of civilisations may be interpreted as making explicit what is implicit in nature, we are learning anew alike from science, scholarship and philosophy. For instance, the mytho-poetic creations of Ancient Greece are thus being made intelligible to modern minds as an example of man's power to light the flame of divinity on the hearth of nature. Theopoesy is the word by which the later Greeks characterised this human faculty; and surely it describes that combined mental and social process with admirable precision.

AGAIN, the finer spirits of the mediæval cloister, though handicapped by a harsh logic, yet cultivated a rapturous devotion to Nature. In the lives of St. Columba, St. Bernard, St. Francis and their like, we find a serene appreciation of the benediction of natural things:

"Delightful would it be to me to be in Uchd Ailum
On the pinnacles of a rock,
That I might hear the song of the wonderful birds,
Source of happiness."

Thus sings St. Columba, the nature-lover, to console himself, on lonely missions, with memory of favourite haunts at home in Iona far away. "Go out into the woods," says St. Bernard, "you will

learn more there than from all the books." St. Francis acclaiming sun, fire, water, birds and other creatures as his brothers and sisters, points the truth which evolutionary theory is gradually elaborating. This renewing veneration of nature has profound influence on the modern mind, and is capable of going a long way as a corrective of superstition and fanaticism. Instead of the instinctive or half rational selection of certain isolated things as sacramental, we now expect to find, and are always justified in the expectation, that all the natural conditions of our life are charged with grace. The belief that deeply latent in the intention of nature is spirit, *i.e.*, the manifestation and enjoyment in ever richer and more concrete forms, of truth, beauty, freedom, love and other perfections, has of course great consequence. It leads to the systematic evocation of latencies instead of the casual repression of instincts. It invests science with a truly hieratic function and responsibility. It bids us live in every way—physical, mental and spiritual—close to Nature. And the humanised voice of Nature that calls to us insistently is revealed in the joy of children, the deeds of heroes, the rapture of saints, the *prima donna's* song, the lover's lyric. It is declaimed in the wisdom of prophets; uttered in the policies of statesmen; whispered by the mother in her home; made manifest by the cathedral-builder in his city. This voice of nature pealing through man gives a new guiding principle for education, which is already being applied from the foundation to the summit. It affords a really concrete view of personality in relation to community, tradition and environment, and reveals the necessary part which is played in spiritual development by regional, civic and occupational conditions of life. It teaches that our common human nature, with all its needs, activities and relations, contains the whole gamut of true devotion, which is the ordering of all this detail so as to be the expression of a supreme harmony; and therefore that the desecration, contempt and omission of any note of the scale (such, for instance, as physical labour) must vitiate the music which is the health and sanity alike of personality and community. In these and other ways the sanctions of nature, and the latent sanctity of every element in natural life, are coming to be recognised as never before.

BUT a not less remarkable change is taking place in the general attitude to personality and community. They are being regarded increasingly as having a predominantly spiritual character, which must be kept first in mind, so that the religious aspect of these matters is proving to be the scientific aspect also, and the necessary guide of practical effort. How thoroughgoing, in this supreme issue, the accord between science and sanctity, is well illustrated in the following passage from Scott Holland, most vital of recent theologians; for it might be incorporated into the core of a treatise on sociology without a word of alteration:—"Personality lies in the relation of person to person. A personality is what it is by virtue of its power to transcend itself and

enter into the life of another. It lives by interpenetration, by intercourse, by communion. Its power of life is love. What we mean by personality is a capacity for retaining self-identity by and through identification with others—a capacity for friendship, for communion, for fellowship. Hence the true logic of personality compels us to discover the man's personal worth in the inherent necessity of a society in which it is realised. Society is the expression of the inter-communion of spirit with spirit."

THE historic conflict of science and religion, as we learn to view it in perspective, appears more and more in the guise of a faction fight about unessentials. And the clatter of the contest continues. The noise and dust of a formidable assault is, for instance, raised in a recent Roman polemic against "humanitarians." They in general, and Mr. H. G. Wells in particular, (the title of Father Dudley's book: *WILL MEN BE LIKE GODS?* is a challenge to Mr. Wells) are indicted for the vague and abstract nature of their ideals. The criticism is, no doubt, driven well home. Then in a final chapter this theologian submits the reality. It is the Church's scheme of salvation through the redemptive office of grace. "The world of grace," he says, "is an inner Kingdom . . . a living, quivering, intense reality." And he goes on to ask, "What is *grace*?" He answers, "it is the life-power of those souls within the Kingdom." But is not mastery of the inner life, joyous and serene, the very quest of humanists at their best? Their prescriptions for its attainment may be ineffective. But they may well be grateful to Father Dudley for defining, with considerable precision, the life-qualities which they seek. Here then is another instance of religious phrasing which might advantageously be taken over *verbatim* by the sociologist towards expressing the relation of inner and outer life, as he, progressing with the run of modern thought and research, is learning to see it.

ON all sides we see a newly dawning sense of the transcendent dignity of persons and communities. They are again becoming actually sacred, and therefore no longer ours to do what we like with or to profane. We are learning again to ask that individuals should be chiefly noble, not chiefly comfortable and successful; and that our towns may some day flame like famous cities of old, and even with a whiter and purer glow than ever before. We are coming to respect the self-determination of persons and communities, and treasure their individuality, in order that they may reveal characteristic modes of spirit. All this is the beginning of a return to the Dedicated Life. Many now devote themselves, with truly religious vocation, to "social work," which at its best signifies the ideals of personality and community; but their children, or their children's children, will come nearer to understanding these ideals as the inspiration of the whole of life, so that all work shall be "social work," and every occupation dedicated.

It is true that popular notions with regard to personal advantage and social improvement are still too largely profane and misleading, since

they do not habitually include the conception of dignity ; yet dignity is unconsciously the end in view ; and the actual suffering in the mind of the workers, and just cause of their unrest, is the ache of accumulated indignities. To celebrate in every possible way the sacredness of persons and of communities, and to make all our relations with them the expression of their superlative worth, is a work which (let us resolve) must henceforth unite all human faculties and labours in concerted and creative worship. This may not, for long time to come, attain prodigious symbolic expression, comparable to the old cathedral ; but the most naïf achievements, if equally sincere, are hardly less precious. There is no reason why we should not attain to a life not less but more simple, spiritual, laborious, luminously dedicated, dignified, than that life of religious men which, by its transparent exposition of the higher values, was the soul of the mediæval achievement. For succour in that attainment we have all their resources and much more. We have the vast accretion and purification of knowledge, the manifold development of practical arts, the spirit of tolerance, and the larger general experience of the modern age. All this should give us reasonable hope for the future, if we go forward with confidence in the principles alike of science and of sanctity.

To distinguish sacredness wherever it actually resides and to order life so that every detail shall be transparent to its higher values is the way to every kind of personal and social good. This is to *work at the picture*—the supreme art-creation which unites individuals, interests and peoples, constitutes unanimity, and gives its character to a whole epoch. To this systematic labour of expressing dignity, no detail can be insignificant. Towns, streets, homes, gardens, workshops, clothing, furniture, utensils, are in essential particulars the expression of spiritual values. True it is, that too generally these values are false or degraded ones ; so that appearances of dignity are often fictitious and a mockery, as in the ornate façades of palatial banks, the ermine of hard-faced judges, the silken hoods of learned pedants, the furs and feathers of flaunting women. But on all sides are visible luminous tendencies towards truer valuations and finer expressions. Various evidences might be shown of the sense of a sacredness of cities, of labour and craftsmanship, of homes, of childhood, and of the life of the poor ; though we should find at the same time that this movement toward the "sacring of life" is still for the most part playing at the matter ; incapable of systematic exploration and of trenchant performance ; unaware as yet that it is a matter which must be *lived*. The truer ideals are still but a veneer on the massive old worm-eaten structure of material wealth, comfort and conventionality. We shall begin vigorously to move when we recognise that *all* the conditions of our life bear within them the seeds of sanctity awaiting opportunity to germinate, grow and blossom.

V. BRANFORD.

SPENCER, DARWIN AND THE EVOLUTION-HYPOTHESIS :
by P. J. Hughesdon.

A GENERATION ago the idea of evolution was in Great Britain identified almost entirely with the easily combined versions presented in the writings of Spencer and Darwin. The idea itself may very well prove to be radically sound ; but I should surmise that a generation hence the then ascendant version or versions may derive little from either of those once acknowledged masters. My reasons will appear below. Since however I shall be dealing with writings and with subjects of which my knowledge is unfortunately much more limited than I could wish, what I shall have to say must be understood as mainly tentative rather than categorical.

I SHALL begin with a general criticism. In the case of Spencer fundamental, I should say, is the expansion of the ideas, on organic development and on heredity respectively, enunciated by the biologists Baer and Lamarck and this, taken with other points also, as the definition of life, the attitude to consciousness, the physiological analogy applied in social investigation, seems to indicate that Spencer's evolution theory was primarily biological. The theory thus appears as probably associated too closely with the time-spirit of an age occupied with the first extensive revelations of prehuman history to possess more than partial validity, while further its subordination of the psychical factor might be found difficult to reconcile with the nowadays strengthening idealist and "ontological" confidence in the essential fitness of things and reasonableness of existence and the ultimate reality of value. Darwin's theory of course is in itself exclusively biological, however extended its application or misapplication in other hands. But it seems to me open to precisely the same general criticism. Its exaltation of individualism and competition, likewise its reliance upon the fortuitous, belongs as much to the age in which it appeared as does the biological prepossession of Spencer. Further, its supporters have to meet the dilemma that either it must deny the absolute reality of value in the biological sphere, apparent or relative value in which is held to be the outcome of combined chance and conflict, and therefore by implication must deny the absolute reality of all value whatever or else it must deny all qualitative ratio and correspondence between cause and effect in the biological sphere and therefore by implication generally, a denial not less incompatible with idealistic conceptions. Objection might of course be taken to the above criticism as apriori and metaphysical and as even so of a kind that many apriorists and metaphysicians would not admit. I should myself think that the apriori and the metaphysical have their rightful place even in respect of inductive science. However, in what more I have to say I shall not again introduce such considerations.

To return then to Spencer, I have already said that the two principal features in his speculations were the view of heredity and the principle of development. Regarding the former I will only remark that it is an extreme version of a much disputed theory which both presents great difficulties and applied in psychology as it is applied by Spencer, leads to complete scepticism. Next as regards the principle of development, this, if the interpretation suggested below of certain modern tendencies be correct, entirely fails to represent social development and therefore, whatever its total or partial truth in other spheres, fails at least as a universal principle. Here I may be allowed to quote, with a few verbal alterations, and additions, the concluding sentences of a communication of mine on BEAUTY to the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW for July, 1923.

"PRIMITIVE activity of course is very largely undifferentiated. Art, science (including philosophy), practice, to take the ordinary and convenient, though really imperfect classification of fundamental spheres,¹ are only gradually (and never entirely) discriminated. Further discrimination results in the segregation of the main arts, sciences, practical spheres, and finally in the detail specialisation of modern life, while at the same time as the above vertical differentiation of knowledge and function there develops a horizontal differentiation especially into what may perhaps be distinguished as aristocratic or comparatively conceptual and popular or comparatively perceptual culture (or, to use Spencer's, as it seems to me, inadequate terminology, into regulative and operative functions). But, I would suggest, there are now discernible the symptoms and beginnings of a reverse movement in which the distinctions and demarcations thus established, while recognised as possessing a certain lasting validity, will be gradually transcended and the disintegrated culture of modern times will be gradually reintegrated so that something in the nature of a final reunion even of the main spheres and activities may be considered possible This movement of progressive reintegration should however be distinguished from various attempts at restoration on retrograde lines by which it has been preceded, attempts in which the soundness of the previous disintegration was and is denied and it is sought not to transcend but to annul and obliterate existing distinctions and segregations. Such retrogression is by no means always indefensible; thus it may be capable of justification in greater or less measure in relation to the circumstances of the age. The full realisation too of the disintegrating-reintegrating or analyticosynthetic process is much qualified by various factors and influences, so that the process should not be readily used as a test of progress. And the abrogation of

¹ Really the practical sphere corresponds to the art-science sphere as a whole. The above tripartite division is yet more misleading where associated with the tripartite distinction of mental powers as thought, feeling, will. Concerning the latter distinction see a brief and perhaps not wholly satisfactory note of mine on CONDUCT (SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Oct., 1922).

once serviceable distinctions may sometimes be entirely and permanently proper, as in the prospective unification of chemistry and physics."

IN science the synthetic movement outlined in the above extract is, I think, obvious, the increasing interdependence of the various sciences, the mainly introspective and the mainly inductive alike, being generally recognised. In practical affairs again the most notable analytic movement, the progressive discrimination and segregation of politics and industry, seems to have culminated in the nineteenth-century separation—quite misinterpreted, I think, in Spencer's theory of militancy and industrialism—a separation which has since begun to yield to a new convergence partly on the lines of so-called state-socialism. Art, where the movement is perhaps least apparent, yet presents certain suggestive features. Here however I would first observe that the several primary arts appear to admit of arrangement in two triads, namely, first, architecture, sculpture and painting, secondly, music, prose and poetry, the one triad dependent on spatial and palpable media, the other on temporal and impalpable media (chiefly of expressive sound, not including however the merely conventional sound-element in language), the corresponding members of each triad having also certain affinities. With regard to the former series I would note the growth of the feeling that sculpture and painting require an appropriate architectural setting, while architecture similarly needs an appropriate complement of sculpture and painting on the lines not of fresco and relief, which would be retrograde, but rather of niched statuary, affixed panels, &c.² As regards the second series, the disintegration into "absolute" music and tuneless literature appears in recent times as qualified by reintegrating tendencies. "More consciously than ever before," says Dr. Ernest Walker,³ "instrumental music is straining beyond its own special domain and asking for external spurs to creative activity" and these spurs have been found, he notes further, not in linguistic art only but beyond in formative art as well. Verse like Keats's ODE ON A GRECIAN URN and the occasional choice by painters of themes with a literary origin are also perhaps symptomatic of a general æsthetic reconvergence, though, as regards arts belonging to different groups, without anything yet in the nature of collaboration.⁴ And even in respect of the main spheres

² It must however be remembered that few buildings have a primarily æsthetic purpose. The material relations mentioned are of course indicative of immaterial relations.

³ In MARVIN'S RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT, chapter on music.

⁴ We may conceive the folk-dance with appropriate setting of what afterwards developed into formative art as standing for art primitive and integral. So again, to figure the convergent lines of development in the art of a perhaps not very remote future, we may think of a combined concert-hall and art-gallery in which not merely the building and exhibits on the one side, the music and libretto on the other, but also the abiding expressions of the one art-group and the repeated expressions of the other have been created with mutual reference, resulting in mutual amplification and illumination and there is besides more popular and social inspiration and appreciation than in the aristocratic and individualistic art of recent ages.

of activity discriminated above an incipient tendency towards mutual esteem and help—practical life tending to become more artistic and scientific and art and science more appreciatively conscious of each other and also more alive to practical issues—may, I think, be detected.

SYNTHESIS of aristocratic and popular culture has been so greatly distorted or hindered that to deal with it at all satisfactorily in a few words is practically impossible. Tendencies of the kind may well however have been the soundest factor in the modern popular striving, primarily in the political and industrial spheres, after a larger and worthier and less exclusively "operative" part and on the aristocratic side in the reawakened interest in folk-song and other forms of popular culture. From various causes however not only has popular culture been a very defective growth but much of its actual achievement must have been disrupted and lost.

MOVEMENTS on the other hand that, while evidencing the need for synthesis, are in themselves largely retrograde, whether or not with adequate warrant, are perhaps exemplified in Comte's attempted unification of the social sciences with its repudiation of previous discrimination, in the Wagnerian Opera, so far as looking back towards both an undisintegrated art-unity and an undisintegrated folk-unity, in democracy, as involving an at least formal equalitarianism on the lines of which the synthesis of aristocratic and popular culture could hardly, I think, be achieved satisfactorily, in free verse, as disallowing the distinction of prose and poetry.⁵

IF the above survey and interpretation be correct,⁶ it is easily shown that Spencer's evolution-principle fails to represent the lines of social development. That principle, it may be well to recall, is formulated by Spencer as follows :—"Evolution is an integration of matter with concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." If the points urged above be sound, social development really tends in respect of knowledge and function alike to proceed through two main phases, the earlier analytic or differentiating or disintegrating, the later synthetic or reassimilating or reintegrating ; further, while the earlier is in the direction of more definite, coherent heterogeneity, the later tends to a combination of such achieved heterogeneity with increasing indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, through progressive overlapping among the spheres demarcated during the earlier period. It is true that throughout the

⁵ The right lines of literary development would perhaps tend towards a combination somewhat like that of Attic dialogue and Doric chorus in the Greek drama. With sculpture and painting one might look for an analogous relation.

⁶ Social actualisation of the analyticosynthetic method, while sound, has of course been undesigned.

earlier period there is increasing integration of a kind on the lines indicated by Spencer. But this integration is not, I think, at variance with the above description. In the first place it is the outcome of two movements quite distinct in character. The one, due chiefly to intercommunication and its increase, is a movement in the direction of the coalescence of previously distinct social entities on a basis of increasing homogeneity, a movement that in combination with the reaction against other similarly coalescing entities has been a chief factor in the growth of national unity. While eminently integrating and both furthering and furthered by the analyticosynthetic process, this movement is essentially distinct therefrom. The other movement also tends, though less directly, to the fusion of originally distinct communities, on a basis however rather of increasing heterogeneity through increasing division of labour, sociological as well as economic, involving increasing interdependence and proceeding on lines that are not for the most part related to the fading demarcation of the communities themselves. This complementary movement belongs essentially to the analytical phase of social development. To the possible objection that that phase appears therefore after all to be integrating rather than disintegrating the right reply, I think, is that, while integrating in the sense of involving increase of interdependence, it is yet in a true sense disintegrating in that the various labour-dividing sections of the community, both the longitudinal sections, as the artistic and the scientific class, and still more the transverse sections, as the ruling and the subject class, tend to become estranged and to cease from sympathetic intercourse.

It should be noted also that the gradual conversion of outward integration on an analytic basis into inward integration on a synthetic basis must proceed in accordance with the character of the synthetic movement itself through the growth of common ground in knowledge and in function, in other words through the overstepping of definite lines of delimitation. Further, while involving a loosening of the ties of interdependence, in other words a loss of coherence (since any one section will be less indispensable the less its knowledge and experience are its own exclusive possession) the transformation also involves a new growth of sympathetic relations, which however should be conceived rather as moving on towards social than as returning to communal unity, and a gradual replacement of rigidity by plasticity of organisation. Hence, as already remarked, the synthetic phase must develop on lines of definite, incoherent homogeneity, though with transcendence rather than obliteration of the definite, coherent heterogeneity achieved during the analytic phase. So much for the changes in matter and still more the underlying changes in mind. With regard to the changes in motion and the underlying changes much the same may be said ; but I should also suppose that during the later

phase there is an acquisition rather than a dissipation of motion, new stores of energy perhaps being drawn upon.

I WOULD note finally that whereas Spencer propounds his principle absolutely or nearly so, the operation of the principle of social and cultural development proposed above is regarded as liable, even in the case of progressive movements, to be qualified, often perhaps to a very great extent, by the operation of various other factors. These I will not now try to enumerate; but there are one or two points that I would rather not omit entirely. As regards the analytic process, first, this never can and never should be carried out completely since the essential unity in human nature and in society is opposed to extreme specialisation, secondly, the energising of latent factors in human nature may be involved in all social progress and may thus constantly open out new fields for analytic inquiry; as regards the synthetic process, apart from other qualifying factors, the bringing this process to completion might well be a superhuman achievement.

NEXT as regards Darwinism. Here I would first suggest as a prime factor in biological evolution, instead of a tendency to purely fortuitous variation, an intrinsic capacity for development—with its sequel certainly of ultimate decay—this capacity characterising primarily the continuously existing germ-plasm but having its somatic equivalent in the series of organisms.⁷ That such a capacity really does exist seems to be indicated by well supported cases of orthogenesis and by the periodic character, the "sporting" or, I should say, spurting tendency of organic development believed in at least by some biologists. Germ-plasm development may at the same time be largely dependent upon extraneous influences, directly upon the internal or intra-soma environment and therefore indirectly upon the external or extra-soma environment, the environment, that is, of the succession of organisms in which the germ-plasm has lived and obtained sustenance, the chief determinants being adequate supplies of food and warmth and adequate urging to and scope for appropriate and congenial organic activity. And this means between germ-plasm and somatic series in developing races—I use the term "race" in a quite general sense—a mutual furtherance of development, since the constantly more developed and better equipped and therefore better faring organisms that have sprung from a constantly developing germ-plasm provide in their turn for the latter a constantly more favourable and stimulating environment. For germ-plasm development on such lines a sufficient, perhaps a plentiful food-supply may well be necessary. Yet such a food-supply should be available even under the conditions of general insufficiency postulated by Darwin, following Malthus; for it is required only for the developing, that is, the prospering races and only

⁷ I have used Weismann's terms as convenient, but the views expressed do not necessarily involve his segregating theory.

for their mature members and a rate of increase outstripping that of the food-supply even of the prospering races would not mean insufficient food for their mature members were the excess-increase carried off before reaching maturity by other agencies than insufficiency, by natural causes or preying enemies for instance. Again, germ-plasm development, while to a considerable extent orthogenetic, may yet be characterised throughout by alternative possibilities, in that the actual line taken within the range of possibilities may depend chiefly upon environmental influence, the determinable points being not only whether and on what lines the germ-plasm will continue to develop but further how far the correspondingly developing organisms will prosper. Hence an environment—primarily an inorganic environment—offering increasing and progressively diversified opportunities to those organisms whose equipment attains to requisite standards will call forth a large and diversified organic advance. Further, the full utilisation of such opportunities may involve considerable migration into unoccupied areas.

ONE may also conjecture on the lines of the above that the germ-plasm is immortal only in somewhat the same way as the single-cell organism, in other words that it is immortal only where owing to the absence of stimulating conditions it undergoes no development, that otherwise the germ-plasm is subject, like the brief-lived organisms springing from it, to the cycle of growth, maturity, decay, this cycle being reflected in the race-history or somatic succession regarded as a whole. Indeed, germ-plasm decline, ensuing upon a period of highly specialised development, may, I should think, have been a factor in the extinction of once dominant races. And if the geological evidence for racial senescence be scanty, it should be remembered that external conditions might often abbreviate the latest phase.

AGAIN, organic development should perhaps be attributed rather to fostering and co-operation than to sifting and competition. Respecting the relations between the organic and the inorganic world, the fostering element was recognised by Darwin, though, I should be disposed to say from my limited knowledge of his views, inadequately and defectively because too much merely as a competitive asset. Thus in the *ORIGIN OF SPECIES* (p. 46, sixth edition) he says: "I use this term [struggle for existence] in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another. A plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture." Concerning which I would ask first how relations of support can be included, metaphorically or otherwise, under those of conflict, secondly, whether the former rather than the latter relations might not in general be "more properly" asserted. Similarly the statement (p. 50) that climate tells chiefly in stimulating competition through causing periodic

shortage suggests the reflection that climate might perhaps with equal truth be said to stimulate development through causing periodic abundance. The idea however of the inorganic world as primarily sustaining and stimulating rather than pruning and weeding, appears to have been gaining ground since Darwin's time and to have reached a prospect of far greater advance in the future, so that an eminent zoologist, Professor Gamble, F.R.S., could speak some years back of "that refined and intimate associateship between living energetics and inanimate forces of which biology is only beginning to form a conception" (*THE ANIMAL WORLD*, p. 142). Similarly as regards the relations between plant-world and animal-world, between different races, between members of the same race, there would seem to be increasing recognition of dependence, interdependence, co-operation. Concerning symbiosis for instance it is said that "the idea is rapidly becoming a dominant one" (*ANIMAL WORLD*, p. 167), that "everywhere symbiosis"—understood somewhat more generally—"is coming to the fore" (Reinheimer, *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, vol. XV., No. 2, p. 151). Helpfulness and co-operation among members of the same race, the value of which as a competitive factor, that is in racial competition, was likewise recognised by Darwin, are of course sometimes wonderfully close. But if congenial and stimulating rather than rigorous and oppressive inorganic conditions have actually been associated with organic progress and this in turn has been increasingly characterised by interdependence rather than by incompatibility, if, further, support, mutual or onesided, compared with attack or conflict, usually means more wholesome activity and also, so far as it has a directly productive quality, results in greater abundance, then facts appear to substantiate the view of organic development as attributable to influences of the former rather than of the latter kind.*

WITH the necessary alterations the above argument may, I think, be applied also in the main to stationary and to retrograde races, retrogression being attributable chiefly to insufficient or unsuitable feeding or functioning and sometimes resulting in withdrawal to a different and inferior but more tolerable habitat. Further, as a rule the organically stationary races have been locally stationary too; it is the inwardly changing, whether in ascent or decline, that have moved outwardly, the one kind into more rigorous but uplifting, the other into easier but debasing surroundings, and thus life, beginning perhaps and still continuing in the shallows, has spread thence to the plains and the surface waters, to the hill-tops, the air, the underground regions and the depths and bed of the ocean.

DEVELOPMENT however is not the same thing even as progressive change; there is also progressive adaptation, external and internal. Premising

* Huxley's contrast of the cosmical and ethical processes as conceived by him should perhaps have suggested a revision of his conceptions.

that adaptation, even more than development, is very largely inexplicable on any scientific theory yet put forward, I would urge here the following points. Racial development, by reason both of its progressive quality and of the greater differentiation of needs involved, is likely upon the whole to make for greater adaptation at least where the habitable sphere is expanding and is itself developing in variegated richness. Next, whatever truth there is in the theory of natural selection, in the view, that is, of adaptation as an attribute of environment-selected variation, one may suggest that adaptation is not less an attribute, through migration for instance, of variation-selected environment, new types searching out suitable surroundings, while there must also have been between variation and environment reciprocal selection with consequently increasing mutual adaptation. Again, racial habits must often have directly adapted the environment either enduringly or with constantly renewed modification. And although racial adaptation through transmission of somatic modifications must not be assumed, the transmission of such qualities in the germ-cells is not open to the same objections and on these lines we may perhaps conceive of concordant variation of body-cells and germ-cells in cases even of originally diverse needs. For instance, one can imagine a race adopting a mode of life that necessitated larger consumption of a particular food-constituent. The germ-cells, as not directly participating in this change of function and therefore not needing to repair on the new lines, would probably at first refuse the additional material. But should the remaining nutriment prove insufficient, they might gradually adjust themselves to the change and so the organisms developing from them would tend to acquire a more suitable innate constitution. And there are of course the Neo-Lamarckian theories.

LET us turn now to the view that ascribes organic evolution primarily to the selective tendencies of a largely competitive struggle in which serviceable chance-variation, whether gradual or abrupt,⁹ favours survival and propagation. We may consider first the working of the distinguishable selecting agencies.¹⁰

(i.) INSUFFICIENCY leading to competitive struggle. This, as already argued, will not operate where the other factors are equal to carrying off all increase exceeding the means of subsistence. Further,

⁹ To admit the sudden appearance of new organs really means, if, as now seems likely, Mendelism cannot help here very far, admitting an innate capacity for development and assigning to natural selection a secondary part. Yet such discontinuity is now accepted by biologists of repute; its rejection too involves the well-known difficulty that gradually developing organs would not be serviceable in their early stages together with the more recent difficulty involved in the view of gradual change as merely consisting in the unravelling of mixed strains.

¹⁰ Application to the plant-world of the arguments used above should be qualified throughout by recognition of differences both in plants themselves, as absence of instinct and intelligence, also comparative immobility, and in the environmental factors depended upon, as preponderance of the inorganic.

in periods of scarcity inadequate nutriment by checking positive or augmentative variation might well neutralise the quickening influence on racial progress of elimination of the more backward members.¹¹ I would ask too whether the surviving fitter in the intra-race struggle be not so much the fitter by nature, those possessing some inborn and transmissible but perhaps as yet undeveloped advantage as the fitter in actual condition, those especially in the prime as against the immature and the effete.

(ii.) NATURAL enemies. Here too one may suggest that not the potentially but the actually fitter, the adult and adolescent, are likely to prove successful. Again, while concealing or similarly helpful qualities especially of colour may here tell powerfully (alike with pursued and with pursuers, though in the case of the latter they would have to be considered with reference to the previous agency, namely insufficiency), yet such qualities may be merely superficial qualities and so far their constant selection, though leading sometimes to curious results, has little importance for organic development. Besides, as regards concealing qualities, the general connexion between outward inconspicuousness and inward insignificance would favour the more backward. Next, a factor of much moment in success whether of attack or defence is collective solidarity, while to a very great extent it is the helpless or still unhatched offspring that are preyed upon and here the chief cause determining survival is parental care. But solidarity and parental care are primarily qualities of co-operation, and it is to this fact that they owe their competition-value.

(iii.) FORCES of nature. It might perhaps be urged that these have been very important for organic development, because to their action is chiefly ascribable the large destruction of young life, likewise of eggs in the case of those species where some degree of parental solicitude is required. On this I would remark that survival is here the result in perhaps approximately equal measure of endurance in the young and solicitude, presumably inheritable, in the parents. The character of the latter quality has already been noted. As regards the endurance that serves the unhatched or the still dependent young in the struggle against natural forces, this would seem to be almost entirely passive and so far might often be a result of inferior metabolism—life lived at a lower rate—which seems to indicate organic backwardness and inferiority. The same thing, I would remark in passing, may be said of mature individuals also in situations where mere endurance counts for more than appropriate action. A further important point in the working of natural forces—and this holds also of bacterial and parasitical preying which is best considered under the present heading

¹¹ One investigator (Candolle) is said however to have starved plants and thereby obtained better blooms. Unfortunately I do not know the particulars of an experiment which nowadays might be judged inadequate.

—is the large absence of competition, the fact that upon the whole positive rather than comparative qualities have told, that the fit rather than the fitter have survived, and under such conditions there could be no indefinite forcing up of the survival standard, apart, that is, from environmental change.

(iv.) FAILURE to light upon a suitable maturing environment. In those cases where no provision is made to secure the conditions necessary for reaching maturity the destruction of seeds and eggs for want of such conditions has little significance for evolution. Selection however is not excluded altogether. Thus in the case of plants depending for fertilisation or dissemination upon the visits of animals there is competition in attractive power. At the same time we have here some of the most notable instances of interdependence in the organic world; one may say in fact that in such cases there is competition for co-operation. Regarding competition for conjugation among the spermatozoa, which perhaps is best considered here, one may ask why extreme mobility should not be taken to indicate organic lightness rather than organic superiority.

THE operation of the above sifting agencies, it should also be noticed, is in part not cumulative but alternative and mutually exclusive. Thus the death-rate in respect of the first agency depends largely upon the survival-rate in respect of the last three agencies.

So far the problem of survival has been dealt with as affected by the factors of conflict and selection. I shall now try to consider it briefly as affected by the factors of variation, variation respectively in the organism or the race and in the environment.

We may begin with variation of the former kind bearing on the ability to procure food, in other words variation in relation to the agency of scarcity. A favourable variation here would probably give access to fresh supplies—to take the stock instance, the tallest giraffe would be able to browse on leaves beyond the reach of the rest; or it might lead to an enterprising advance into some other and superior environment yielding a larger return to better equipment. In either case competition would be relaxed and selection, whatever its efficacy, diminished—sometimes of course there might be results the contrary of these in the newly entered sphere. Contrariwise an unfavourable variation would probably mean either restricted scope as regards procuring food and therefore more acute competition among those directly affected or else retreat into an inferior environment. It might perhaps be argued against the above that favourable variation, even if at first affording relief, would lead to such an increase of the favoured race or individuals as must presently intensify competition and culminate in the extermination of rivals. This certainly might sometimes occur; but generally, if the views expressed above are

correct, a progressive and prospering variety would continue for a long time to vary progressively and every fresh advance would be likely still further to differentiate it organically and separate it outwardly from former competitors. Indeed I cannot help surmising that progressive variation has operated far less by giving its possessors an advantage in the struggle for existence than by enabling them to migrate into areas more exacting perhaps but also more favourable to well endowed and progressive races. I should surmise further that such advance need not have been prompted by sheer necessity; with reference at least to the higher animal races it may be important to recognise the distinction between the struggle for existence and the effort after a larger and more congenial existence and after a fuller realisation of potentialities.

VARIATION in relation to enemies and to natural forces, so far as it did not lead to migration in those varying and consequently to lessened competition, and in relation to the chance of obtaining a suitable maturing environment, would chiefly have the result, if favourable to immediate survival, of intensifying, if unfavourable, of easing the subsequent competition for food and so in the sum would not lessen the severity, though it might modify, largely on the ineffective lines already indicated, the incidence of selection. But most variation must affect more than one relation.

OF changes in the environment, including changes resulting from a breakdown of natural barriers, much the same may be said. Progressive change increases and diversifies opportunities and so, in relation to advancing races, not only helps to perpetuate progressive organic change but also moderates competition; retrograde change curtails opportunities and so hinders differentiation and advance and intensifies competition. It might perhaps be objected that improving external conditions would lead to increased reproduction and fewer premature deaths and so would tend to reduce the general standard of existence to its former level. But one must remember that organic advance together with the higher and richer existence involved therein has generally been associated with a falling rate of reproduction.

THIS fall in the rate of reproduction attending organic advance involves a further serious objection to the theory of natural selection. For according to the theory a high rate of reproduction should have great survival-value, first because the numbers of a race tell in the struggle as well as the individual fitness of its members and secondly because, at least according to the theory as stated by Darwin, the greater the numbers the greater also the chance of further favourable variation. These advantages appear to be lost with the loss of fecundity involved in organic progress, which therefore, even where helpful to the individual, need not constitute a racial advantage.

DARWINISM also seems involved in uncertainty whether congenial conditions that favour survival but lower the standard or uncongenial conditions with a reverse tendency be the more helpful. The dilemma suggests a futile seesaw between softening prosperity and bracing adversity.

I WOULD like also to propose a query on the point of sheer probability. If variation be entirely haphazard, then may not the general infrequency of appreciably favourable organic variation be so great that, in combination with the considerable chance, even in the case of an unusually well equipped individual, against attainment and completion of maturity, it must render the enduring perpetuation of such variation nearly impossible, and this even though the chance in favour of a suitable variation tends, especially where the standard of survival is rising, to increase with every generation? In other words, may not the far larger total number of mean individuals, with whom must also be reckoned here the unfitly or indifferently varying extremes, have greater survival-value than the better equipment of the fitly varying extreme? And more generally, do not many racial peculiarities of structure, behaviour, metamorphosis suggest that on the theory of fortuitous variation, limited only by mechanical necessities, the possibilities of variation must be indefinite and the chances of fit variation therefore extremely small?

I WOULD also like to know the views of physicists whether, had factors of conflict and competition prevailed in biological development to the extent required, the stores of energy actually existing in the organic world could ever have been accumulated.

EXTENSION of natural selection to relations within the germ-cell may avoid part of the above criticisms, but if no strong reasons can be given why in the case of a fortuitous germ-cell variation serviceable in the internal environment the corresponding somatic variation should in its turn be serviceable in the external environment, if further the chances are heavily against any particular fortuitous variation proving serviceable, then the chances apparently against any germ-cell variation proving serviceable in respect of the external environment may easily be enormous. And after all may not the element of interdependence or co-operation be preponderant here also, both generally and in the relations of male and female cell—in these latter especially if for Mendelian *dominant* and *recessive* we ought rather simply to say *present* and *absent*? I would also make a similar query regarding true sexual selection, that is sexual selection where not force but attraction decides, whether direct attraction or attraction of an intermediary, as with insect-effected fertilisation of plants.

IN conclusion, I would suggest that natural selection fails to account for natural beauty, to those at least for whom beauty is real and not a figment of association.

P. J. HUGHESDON.

POSTSCRIPT. It might be well if the general relation between the parts of the above article dealing respectively with Spencer and with Darwin were briefly indicated. The former part then, I should say, is concerned with superorganic development in connexion partly with economic but chiefly with social relations, the latter part with organic development in connexion partly with social but chiefly with economic relations—the “epoch-making” influence upon both Darwin and Wallace of the economic speculations of Malthus may here be appropriately recalled. Further, as regards superorganic development there is a certain general connexion between analytic and competitive tendencies on the one hand and synthetic and co-operative tendencies on the other hand, the process of disintegration being accompanied with a transition from communal to sectional and later individualist activities and the process of reintegration with a complementary transition to social—or combined individualist and communal—activities. Whether as regards organic development anything at all analogous to the analyticosynthetic movement characterising superorganic development be discernible I shall not now attempt to inquire.

I WOULD suggest also that the article has a real connexion with the metaphysical communication to be found on another page of the present number of the REVIEW. This connexion lies in the view explicitly maintained in the communication but also, I think, implicitly underlying the article that existence must conform to right standards of what is fitting, that the highest and most admirable must also be finally truest and most efficient.

P. J. H.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS: THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTACT AND THE LONGER RETROSPECT: by J. Reeves.

I AM PREPARED TO STAKE THE FUTURE ON EDUCATION.—Lord Haldane,
Address to the Workers' Educational Association, October, 1924.

PESTALOZZI, Herbert Spencer, and others have pointed out that education, in the widest sense, should, or does, begin "in the cradle," and that it continues throughout life.¹ During the past few years this general idea has been enforced by the work of anthropologists, which has thrown much light on the fundamental nature and significance of the educational process; and we may now, perhaps justifiably, add one more to our small useful stock of definitions:

EDUCATION CONSISTS IN HANDING DOWN FROM ONE GENERATION TO ANOTHER, AND SPREADING AMONG THE MEMBERS OF EACH GENERATION, THE TRADITIONAL, VERIFIED CULTURE—THE KNOWLEDGE, THE SKILL, THE RESULTS OF EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT—WHICH HAS BEEN AMASSED DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF HUMAN EXISTENCE.

WE thus distinguish between (1) THE ACCUMULATION OF LORE (including educational theory), with which we associate a constant sifting and verificatory process, and (2) THE TRANSMISSION AND DIFFUSION OF LORE, which includes parental and social training or influence as well as ordinary educational practice.

1. THE stock of world-culture has plainly been accumulating, though by no means uniformly, from the earliest human times to the present day. Our ancestors of the Stone Ages, through common observation of the things around them combined with the simple method of "trial and error," learned how to make implements, at first few and crude, then in greater variety and of improved execution; they then discovered how to domesticate animals and to grow plants for food, which rendered possible the existence of the larger community or nation and led to the evolution of state government and other elements of civilisation.

DURING the same long period mankind acquired articulate speech and doubtless began the accumulation of oral, tribal lore, with accompanying rites, such as that which still constitutes an important feature of the lives of illiterate peoples, and which is clearly traceable in the earliest writings of ancient Egypt and other localities. Prehistoric art also appeared—drawings on cave walls, on stone and bone articles, &c.—and, during the early historic period, led to the pictorial record of events, such as the famous Palette of Narmer (probably Menes, the first king of united Egypt), whose symbol, a falcon, is leading a human

¹ Herbert Spencer, EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL AND PHYSICAL.

head by a cord (representing captives) while he is shown inspecting prostrate rows of headless men (slain enemies).

TRUE writing, however, was developing at this time (about 3400 to 3000 B.C.), and during the next thousand years or so the earlier written king-lists, chronicles, stories, magical and religious texts, medical and other documents appeared, while art and industry made much progress.

THE earlier culture of the Orient, as is now definitely known, was largely absorbed by the ancient Greeks, as their civilisation developed from about 1200 B.C. About 800 B.C. they acquired writing, and during the following six centuries, as is well known, they added enormously to the stock of culture, contributing their great plastic and pictorial art, with the development of perspective, the invention of musical notation, the true drama and theatre; their great literature, in addition to notable improvements in language, including the introduction of vowels; the first true history, grammar, logic, political, ethical and educational theory; the earliest organised science and philosophy; and much more. As is also well known, the Romans contributed greatly to literature, to law and to the practical arts, but added comparatively little to scientific or philosophical lore.

THE great lapse of the Middle Ages, especially in the intellectual domain, is now a familiar feature. Unfortunately, both for the accumulation and diffusion of culture, mundane learning fell into disrepute, as is indicated by a letter of Pope Gregory (about 600 A.D.), who expresses the hope that his correspondent is not addicted to the "idle vanities of secular learning," a view which appears to have been fairly representative of the time.² During this period, however, a superior condition of intellectual affairs was maintained in China, where the production of literature proceeded, where real paper and block printing were invented about the 6th century, and where printed books were being issued by or before the 10th century; among the Moslems, who from the 8th or 9th century and onwards were studying, translating and discussing Greek manuscripts, making discoveries in science and writing literature and philosophy at their universities in Bagdad, Cordova (Spain), and other centres, and also in Persia, where Omar Khayyam and others were producing literature in the 11th century and later; and in India, where our "Arabic" numerals were invented and mathematical works issued round about the 10th century.

WHEN the earlier modern Western universities began to arise, with the great medieval revival of literature and art, Greek manuscripts were coming in, at first through the Arabs. These were undoubtedly a great fount of inspiration and they formed the basis of much discussion and commentary. Such work proceeded until the fuller

² Adamson, A SHORT HISTORY OF EDUCATION

Renaissance appeared, and with it the revival of independent origination and critical investigation—elements that had been practically non-existent in the West for many centuries.

SLOW progress was made from the 13th to the 16th century, when Lord Bacon "sounded the trumpet" for a general advancement of learning; and, though for a time the movement was hampered by lack of intellectual freedom, the accumulation of thought has since proceeded without notable or long continued interruption.

PARALLEL progress has been made in the sifting process. The "dreamlike, childlike methods," associated with much irrationality, which were characteristic of the ancient Orient were superseded to a great extent in Greece by methods of free and rational investigation. The result appeared in many directions, but notably in history, from which the legendary and miraculous elements (common in the work of Herodotus) were omitted by Thucydides (5th century B.C.).

IT is, of course, true that the higher classical level was not fully established in ancient times. We find Livy, for example, citing the sweating of blood by images and the birth of two-headed pigs as the precursors of great events. History and chronicles of parallel quality were common during the Middle Ages, and the history of the 13th century has been described as "a mixture of truth and palpable absurdity." But by the end of the 16th century some improvement had been made, and from the late 18th century scientific method has been applied, increasingly, to this and other branches of learning.

It is interesting to note also that the older degenerative idea of social life, which appeared in one of the earliest written works in Egypt (the PROVERBS OF PTAH-HOTEP, "the oldest book in the world," dated about the 29th century B.C.)³, and in earlier Greek writings (the WORKS AND DAYS of Hesiod, about 750 B.C.) was superseded, here and there, during the Greek and Roman period, by the true idea of natural human progress, which appeared to some extent in the works of Empedocles and Aristotle, and in a more developed form in the writings of Æschylus, Horace and Lucretius; and though this view was not generally adopted in classical times—though it was well-nigh lost for eighteen centuries or more, and has, indeed, only been established during the late 19th and the present centuries—its rise in Greece marks a notable advance in thought.

THE sifting process has been especially prominent in educational theory and procedure. Following the more notable writings of Greek and Roman times—of Plato, Quintilian and others—the past two centuries have seen a great succession of writers and teachers who have brought to the bar of reason and experiment every element of educational thought and practice.

³ HISTORIANS' HISTORY OF THE WORLD.

2. PASSING now to the transmission and diffusion of culture, we note that this process is, to some degree, automatic and inevitable. During the Stone Age, for example, some of the knowledge and skill involved in the making and use of implements and other activities would be gained by the rising generation through common observation and imitation of the proceedings of adults. At a later date incidental precept and demonstration would be added, and this would gradually pass to what may be called primitive oral teaching. This would doubtless come to include the intense preparation for tribal initiation, which is so striking a feature of the life of existing barbarians.⁴

WHEN true writing appeared, as in Egypt, the office of "scribe" arose, owing in part, no doubt, to the necessity for keeping a growing mass of state records, the issue of proclamations, correspondence and the like, and there are indications that the earliest literary teaching was of the nature of incidental help given by the scribes to those who were to join the profession. At a later date, it is evident that something in the way of collective education was given in Egypt, as we hear of the Temple and Office "schools" (and of the daily allowance of food for a boy—two bread cakes and three jugs of beer—being taken to the school by his mother), and "school exercises" of the XIXth dynasty (about 1350 B.C.) have been found.⁵ In Babylonia also, school exercises have been recovered from the ruins of the earliest known "schoolhouse"⁶ which is to be dated, perhaps, as early as 2000 B.C.

WE are thus able to note the progress to early literary education. It was doubtless very limited. Only the scribes, the priests and the sons of rulers and nobles seem to have received teaching of any kind. The curriculum must have been very narrow and the methods very crude. That the process was, indeed, rather painfully uninteresting we gather from a few Egyptian records: "The boy has a back: he attends when it is beaten"; "Thou didst beat my back, and thy instruction went into my ears." And we are hardly surprised to learn that "the pupils left the school with cries of joy."

FOLLOWING an earlier period of exclusively home education in Greece, schools arose from about 500 B.C. They were at first private and afterwards often supported by the State. At these the boys of citizens, except, probably, the poorer class, received an education of a widening type, though the scholars were without text books, and the girls did not attend. (It does not appear, however, that primary education was regarded very seriously, as the boys took pets—cats, dogs and young leopards—to school with them, and a mode of expressing the worst of luck was "dead or schoolmastering.")⁷

⁴ Marett, ANTHROPOLOGY.

⁵ British Museum, GUIDE TO THE EGYPTIAN COLLECTIONS.
Maspero, THE DAWN OF CIVILIZATION.

⁶ Breasted, ANCIENT TIMES.

⁷ Beatty, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EDUCATION.

IN the Roman area schools similarly arose after the conquest of Greece in the 2nd century B.C., and a state system, for both boys and girls, developed and spread over the Empire, the earliest imperial supports of schools beginning about 75 A.D., and the first schedule of teachers' salaries appearing in 376 A.D. The Roman scholars could have their own books, which were copied by enslaved Greeks.

WE must note also the higher schools of Rome and the universities and libraries of Greece and Rome, including the first scientific institution founded and supported by the state at Alexandria, where Euclid taught mathematics in the 3rd century B.C.

THEN, following on the disappearance of the Roman educational institutions and the cessation of general education for more than a thousand years, we find "public schools" arising in the West, at which an unknown, but undoubtedly small, number of males were educated. The rise of the towns and trade, however, from about 1000 B.C., and the necessity for keeping accounts, conducting correspondence and the like, was evidently creating a wider demand for education; and by about 1400, the English villeins, *although they might be fined by their lords for so doing*, were sending their sons in increasing numbers to the schools, which were eventually thrown open to them by the Statute of Labourers of 1405-6.⁸ Langland (PIERS PLOWMAN) refers to this state of educational affairs as follows:

"Now may every cobbler set his son to school,
and every beggar's brat learn from the book,
and become a writer and dwell with a lord,
or a false friar to serve the devil."

THREE to four centuries later the Nonconformists, who for some time had been debarred, by repressive legislation, from teaching in the schools, achieved a considerable measure of emancipation; some relief was also granted to Roman Catholics; and the way was opened to a more general advance.

ABOUT the 16th century schools which may be called "elementary" began to appear. These remained for several centuries of the "Dame School" type. Some idea of their condition may be gathered from the dedication to Edward Coote's book, issued in 1596: "To the unskilful, and to such men and women of trade as Tailors, Weavers, Shopkeepers, Seamsters . . . thou mayst sit at thy shopboard, at thy books, or thy needle and never hinder any work to hear thy scholars, after thou hast made this little book familiar to thee." And, as late as 1799, we find little improvement in the school at Burgdorf, where Pestalozzi taught: "This school contained 73 children. The master was a shoemaker . . . Siegfried's ELEMENTS OF INSTRUCTION, the Heidelberg CATECHISM and the PSALMS were the only things taught

⁸ Pollard, HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

and the only means of teaching . . . At that time Burgdorf was one of the smaller places, not only in Switzerland, but in Europe, where most attention was given to popular education."⁹

DURING the 17th century, probably, following the declaration of Mulcaster that he would admit "young maidens to learn," girls, after remaining illiterate for twelve centuries or so, were again received at the schools.

THE foundations of modern elementary systems were laid in parts of America and in Germany by the middle of the 18th century, in France after the Revolution, and in our own and other countries during the 19th century. When State aid began in England in 1833 it is estimated that two-fifths of the people received no school education of any kind, and that two-thirds to one-half were unable to write their names. As is well known, our elementary education came under the control of the State in 1870, and during the past fifty years signal progress has been made, alike in provision and correlation of educational institutions and in procedure and method of teaching.

ATTENTION may be drawn, in particular, to such recent features as the Regional Survey: the investigation of a locality from the geographical, biological, anthropological, historical and economic points of view. In addition to other advantages, such group or communal work should tend to counteract a possible tendency to undue isolation and individualism consequent on the increased practice of individualised methods of study, such as the Montessori and Dalton systems—a danger which has been pointed out by Durkheim and others.

FOLLOWING the general establishment of public libraries and the beginnings of adolescent and adult education in the larger centres of population, the institution of teachers' and scholars' libraries in some areas, we now look for the formation of educational and social centres in the smaller towns and villages—a need which is now widely recognised.

THE communication of culture to the more backward communities has also well begun. The modernisation of Japan is, of course, essentially a cultural transformation due to Western influence; and we are now informed that the Japanese educational system compares favourably in respect of school attendance with any European country, and that the proportion of literates must now be extremely high.¹⁰ Similarly, very great improvement has been made in India during the past few years, including the education of girls; and in Africa

⁹ Parker, HISTORY OF MODERN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

¹⁰ JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, October, 1924.

training colleges and schools for natives have been instituted or projected in various largely uncivilised areas, as in Tanganyika Territory and Kenya Colony.

It has been indicated that the practice of education in the more deliberate sense, was largely induced by practical needs. But it is clear that, apart from this, education tends to "slop over," as Mr. H. G. Wells puts it. A demand for education of a wider and deeper scope has evidently accompanied social development in general. Of late, this demand has become insistent, owing in part, no doubt, to the recognition by some of the more enlightened members of forward communities, of the necessity of fairly ample knowledge and mental training as a preparation for intelligent citizenship, as well as for the fuller individual and social life, including the suitable employment of an increasing period of leisure.

WE still hear echoes of the older view of the sufficiency of the "three R's" for ordinary people—a view associated with a time when the bulk of them were almost exclusively engaged in working, eating, drinking and sleeping, and took no part in the government of their country; but the demand in question has been conceded to a considerable extent in the more forward countries of the world. Similarly, we hear now and then expressions of regret for the disappearance of "the stick," a view that belongs to an older régime, before it had been recognised that the motive force should come from within; that it should be interest and ambition, and not external compulsion.

HERE we find ourselves in touch with one of the more vital educational considerations. Some have held that as scholastic education is a preparation for life, which is by no means likely to be entirely bland and felicitous, it should not be too easy or pleasant. It should, of course, involve training in effort, increasingly resolute and sustained. But the maintenance of interest and pleasure in studies, including those of the less absorbing kind, seems to be well founded procedure, because of the association of pleasure with mental activity; and it has largely replaced the older urges, such as complaint, imposition and punishment, which probably account, to a great degree, for the common absence of intellectual interest in later life.

BEYOND all this, some proportion of the members of civilised societies have advanced to the conception of mental culture for its own sake; that is, presumably, for the pleasure that is to be derived from contemplative thought, from increased knowledge of themselves and the world about them, with increased power of understanding the multitudinous events of the great cosmic, mundane, personal and social series; and this may be combined with the consciousness that their action is directed, as far as may be, by what they believe to be duly examined principles and not merely by unexamined traditional ideas.

THIS feature began to appear in ancient oriental times : Ashurbanipal, King of Assyria, as early as the 7th century B.C., boasted that his father instructed him in all the wisdom of his time ; and other ancient records, here and there, show the same spirit. In ancient Greece a considerable number of the " free intellectuals " evidently reached this stage, as did also, no doubt, some of the Moslems, and some Europeans, during the Middle Ages ; and the number has, of course, greatly increased during recent years. This advance is in line with the higher aspect of human progress which Prof. J. A. Thomson describes as " the trend towards an increasing dominance of the mental aspect of life, the emancipation of the Psyche."¹¹

THIS emancipative movement was at first very slow, as we might expect in the case of an original evolution. But progress has clearly been accelerative. Though comparatively little educational advance has been recorded for the ancient Orient, that is from about 3000 to 500 B.C., the forward movement was much more rapid in Greece from the latter date to the Roman Conquest, still more rapid in Rome, especially in generality of diffusion, and has been incomparably more rapid during the last two centuries in Europe and America than ever it was before.

SUCH acceleration, within a particular community, is evidently due to the fact that each generation is normally able to start from a slightly higher cultural level than its predecessor. And to this we may add the effect produced on a whole people by the direct absorption of a higher culture. In the case of the Greeks the development of a fairly organised system, on a fairly wide basis, may perhaps be accounted original, a production of Greek genius (though the impulse, if not the actual suggestion of practice, may have been derived from the Orient). But the immediate and rapid Roman advance must be attributed to Greek influence, in conjunction with the fact that the Romans were sufficiently forward intellectually to seize upon the system which they absorbed. It was otherwise when Rome fell. The conquering barbarians knew nothing of science, art, writing, literature or education, and a very serious fall occurred in these as in many other cultural traits. It was not until the dominant people rose, by a slow process of culture-transformation, approximately to the condition formerly attained by the conquered people, that further advance became possible. This point may be said to have been reached during the later part of the 18th century in the most forward countries of the world, and in Europe generally by the middle of the 19th century ; and we have now passed far beyond it.

THE recent educational check, mainly in school provision, following the Great War, may be fairly accounted a transitory phenomena.

¹¹ Thomson, WHAT IS MAN ?

In spite of it much advance has been made in organisation, procedure and method. We may note, in particular, the growth of the international spirit in education, including the advocacy by Dr. Kawerau and others of an International Text Book of History, which will show "how men everywhere contribute to the service of humanity . . . in philosophy, art, science, education and international law . . . Its ultimate form would be a complete sociology of all epochs . . ." ; and the proposal of Dr. Zollinger of an International Bureau of Education with "an institute of pedology," which "would stimulate every effort that widened popular instruction [and] fostered world-fraternity . . ."¹²

J. REEVES.

¹² International Moral Education Congress, Geneva, 1923: SUMMARY OF PAPERS PRESENTED ON HISTORY TEACHING AND SOCIAL SERVICE.

COMMUNICATIONS

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION SUBMITTED TO THE MEDICO-SOCIOLOGICAL CLUB OF EDINBURGH BY THE OUTLOOK TOWER, EDINBURGH.

I. RECALLING our preliminary scientific education,—

DISTINGUISH the *differentia* of each science in which you are interested, i.e.—

WHAT is it essentially about?

WHAT distinguishes its *essential field* from that of other sciences? e.g.,

A. MATHEMATICS.—Geometry, Kinematics, Algebra, Trigonometry, Calculus, &c.

B. PHYSICAL SCIENCE.—Astronomy, Geology, Meteorology, Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, &c., &c.

C. BIOLOGY—and its subspecies, e.g., Anatomy and Histology, Physiology, Taxonomy, Ecology, Ontogeny and Phylogeny.

How are these distinguished from the preliminary sciences?

ARE the above *all* the biological sciences? What of Botany and Zoology? (e.g., to ornithology, orchidology, &c.).

If not, what are omitted? Is *Eugenics* a science?

WHAT about PATHOLOGY?

How are its fields charted for special enquiries within them?

D. PSYCHOLOGY? What are its various fields (i.e., Sub-sciences)?

E. SOCIAL SCIENCES. What are these? Enumerate them as Sub-sciences of Sociology.

WHAT are the *differentia* of Sociology from its preliminary sciences?

AND what are these—and in order of importance?

WHAT are their respective contributions to Sociology as a whole? Their bearings on Biology, &c.

How are they related to PSYCHOLOGY (normal and pathological)?

—and to ETHICS—How far also normal and pathological?

WHAT of ECONOMICS, in its leading Schools—Classical, Socialistic, &c. (Again how far normal and pathological)?

HISTORY.—What is its significance, and uses? (Give example of medical interest.)

How can the preceding and other Social Sciences be clearly tabulated?

WHERE, in such a graphic table, would you put AESTHETICS?

F. LOGIC.—What relation has Logic to each and all of the preceding sciences? And they to it?

G. (Review)—What in Science do you understand to be distinctive of "MATERIALISM" and "TRANSCENDENTALISM"? Of "IDEALISM"? How are these definable in scientific terms?

AND what distinguishes "MECHANISTIC" and "VITALISTIC" doctrines? And "DETERMINISM" and "LIBERTARIANISM"?

II. COMING now to ARTS—What are these? Enumerate them? Graph them in intelligent series and relations.

How and where do you place MEDICINE? What Sciences must it utilise? (a) mainly, and (b) increasingly?

WHAT are its distinctive lines of Action?

How are these to be classified and tabulated?

How relate to SANITATION?

How relate to EDUCATION? to ETHICS? &c.

AND what place, significance and values are to be attached to the "FINE ARTS"?

CAN the Physician utilise any of these? If so, how?

III. BEYOND SCIENCES and ARTS, what do you understand of the position and scope of PHILOSOPHY?

ARE we to accept and be satisfied with any of its treatments of above questions?—so far as attempted, often largely? Which treatments appear to you of most service?

AND what of the position, scope and nature of RELIGION? (also as above, and as widely, i.e., historically, and comparatively, as may be).

How do you distinguish PHILOSOPHY and RELIGION? (i.e., State their respective *differentia*).

As Evolutionists—how, on any current theories, or otherwise, are we to explain the origins of Philosophy, Religion and more—e.g., of Mathematics, or Music, Poetry or Fine Arts, &c.?

THE customary answer (or evasion of answer) to all such questions as the preceding is that "the shortness of life maketh it impossible for any man thoroughly to learn antimony, in which every day something of new is being discovered."

(SUBSTITUTING RADIUM for this 13th century alchemist's antimony, is it not more true than ever?)

YET "the more science advances, the more it is concentrated into little books," said Leibnitz. Do not later minds go on proving this and more than ever?

GIVE brief evidence, from your personal interests and experience, of both the above propositions.

HENCE a final question. Just as you refer to that Laboratory, or the other Library, for its specific purpose of legitimate specialism—Why not now test, and (if found helpful after fair trial), *use* such laboratory, such library, as here?—i.e., those of this Tower as laboratory, and even bibliography and library outlines?

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

FOR it has set for itself this problem, and for more than a generation past—and with sufficient progress to answer all and more than the preceding questions; not of course *completely* (that being quantitatively unthinkable), yet much more clearly than heretofore (and even with reference to their literature, open to all, and at command more fully also).

OUR conspecialised answer to the above questions requires, for general outline, only one (but say conveniently two), sheets of paper this size—save as regards GENERAL PATHOLOGY—which needs another; and HISTORY conveniently one or two more.

(So don't say you haven't time for a book that size!)

YET after some reflection on questions such as the preceding, this will need, however, the equivalent of a hard day's work—say of ten hours, but these distributed over several days (or Sundays!).

PER CONTRA, I venture to say that no one—without some such methods—will answer them without a good few years' work—and on the ground that (with the most unusually favourable conditions, of leisure, travel, &c., and of contacts, from early student days, with the conspecialists of these problems) it has now cost near fifty, to get even as far as to answer above questions, and often necessarily but in outlines; though it is hoped these (with a little patience and practice as above stipulated for) will be found clear.

YET the above promise of answers—through a full (distributed) day's work, may be found disappointing. It may even partially fail.

FOR what reasons? Note that—

(1) their student brings a mind adjusted from and by social conditions unfavourable to active personal thought on unfamiliar questions. Hence this sub-conscious impulse is apt to confine him to one or other of the two usual criticisms of fresh ideas and methods; viz. :—

(a) as untrue, illusory, unnecessary, unpractical, &c.

(b) as already known before! (and so far truly, as per M. JOURDAIN).

SECONDLY, his mind has been adjusted, by life-long education, to and by its auditive and linguistic methods of thought presentment, with strict subordination of the visual mind to the "*print-habit*."

WHEREAS here the treatment is visual—geometric to pictorial: and the transition is difficult. Yet it is soon found delightfully possible to (say) whoever can return to youth sufficiently again to refer to the figures of Euclid I., to the maps of an atlas, and to the pages of a picture-book, preferring to puzzle over them before reading the verbal outlines accompanying them—and refusing these when detached. This aptitude is also in good part recovered through later scientific studies fortunately enjoyed by thinking members of the medical profession throughout its history, and now more than ever. Still, convalescence from verbalism is difficult for us all.

THERE is even a third difficulty; viz., that our minds having been necessarily adjusted by and to existing social systems, temporal and spiritual—e.g.,

(a) to middle and upper class life (especially its Anglicised variety, as in Edinburgh), and

(b) to their appropriate milieu of middle and upper class ecclesiastical systems (Knoxian (Calvinist), Lutheran and Henrican accordingly)

—are at greater disadvantages than are readily realised, in approaching presentments of thought and methods of enquiry which have had their origins independently of all these. (So how?)

THESE customary social beliefs are of course

(a) that these above conditions of temporal security and leisured comfort, with freedom from manual toil, are of advantage in contrast with that of the life of labour.

(BUT here experience of laboratory sciences with their manual habit and skill, are helpful towards disillusionment.)

(b) that these other ecclesiastical conditions (in accordance with the well-established and accepted British and American view) show a practically all-round cultural and scientific superiority to the older ecclesiastical system: (i.e., that of Belfast, Edinburgh and Geneva, or of Berlin and Lambeth, over Rome, Louvain, &c.).

(BUT the relative measure of scientific and technical liberation, from all these traditional systems alike, which is historic to the medical profession (especially in countries of the Roman tradition)—will here be helpful.)

HENCE of all organisations and groups in Edinburgh, the Medico-Sociological may not improbably prove the least inhospitable and least inaccessible to the ideal of joining in the quest of a Bio-synthetic Philosophy—thus embracing the Sciences and Arts in general; as (in particular) the clarification of Sociology with help of ethics, psychology, and biology. And all as founded on the preliminary sciences, as treated on evolutionary methods and as directly applicable in practical life—and thus in Medicine accordingly.

WAS it not Descartes, although himself especially mathematician and philosopher, who said, after long studies of anatomy and physiology:—

“If ever the regeneration of mankind is to be effected, it must be through the Medical Sciences.”

P. GEDDES.

“ERGOGRAHY.”

DEAR SIRS,

THOSE interested in the Leplay House formula of “Place, Folk, Work” may be inclined to favour a new word for a point of view which has suggested itself to the writer of this letter.

THERE would probably be a consensus of opinion on the view that Herbert Spencer's AUTOBIOGRAPHY was important but uninteresting, even irritating. Recently rereading A. C. Benson's criticism of this book in THE UPTON LETTERS at a time when the second volume of Karl Pearson's LIFE OF FRANCIS GALTON was also in his hands, it occurred to one what the reason of this irritation might be, namely that, apart from an impersonal note in the autobiography which sounds discordantly when the ideal of all life histories should obviously be personal—apart from this, the real difficulty that Herbert Spencer had with his subject was very similar to that which Karl Pearson had with Galton's LIFE.

THE truth is that the lives of scientific and inventive minds are difficult material for biography because two groups of ideas needing opposite methods of treatment have to be woven into one harmonious pattern. A biography is no biography if the personal aspect does not shine out clearly and sharply

from its pages, but on the other hand the growth of a process of thought, or the description of the phases of suggestions which have led up to an invention, needs the focussing of the reader's attention not on the personal factor but on the process of, to use a bad metaphor, mental crystallisation, so that the more impersonal the description the better it will be. It is extremely difficult to condense these two outlooks in one volume.

IN SPENCER'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY and in Karl Pearson's FRANCIS GALTON, such attempts are made. It must be obvious to any careful reader of Spencer that the projection of a developing personality—his own, and the projection of many growing and developing ideas on to the canvas of one biographical sketch ends in a patchy and imperfect result. In the first volume alone there are no less than eleven appendices dealing with eleven separate ideas not one of which receives the proper evolutionary treatment it deserves.

KARL PEARSON'S difficulty is, one ventures to think, more formidable than he is himself aware of. He states quite frankly (in the second volume) that the first volume "met with few readers," and no doubt he is rightly concerned by the fact that after-war conditions make it difficult or impossible to publish a collected edition of Sir Francis Galton's researches; therefore he says he has decided that a résumé shall be included in the biography. One wonders if the word "therefore" reveals in this instance the whole of what is in Professor Pearson's mind; is it not even more this—that he very rightly wishes to trace the growth of Galton's ideas *as they manifest themselves in the life*? This was Spencer's difficulty which he could not overcome.

It is here suggested that there is room for another class of work than has as yet been written, an ergographical book, which while running parallel to a given biography yet describes the growth of ideas rather than the growth of a life.

It is really important in the very important problem of the causes of human initiative, to study how fruitful ideas arise, are quickened or stultified in the human mind; but although this study depends on biographical material, it is not biographical subject matter and cannot be added to a biography without a patchy and unassimilated lumpy appearance and style resulting. There is room for a new kind of book, an ergographic volume which should accompany all biographies of minds which are unusually rich in fertile, scenic, creative and inventive ideas. The lack of this can best be illustrated by using the Leplay formula.

PLACE.	FOLK.	WORK.
Geography.	Biography.	Ergography.
Topography.	Ethnology.	Technology.

In each case the starting of the ideas is in the upper line, its working out into recognised types is in the lower. One is not therefore drawing an unwarrantable conclusion if one suggests that there is a very obvious place for the ergographical treatment of the work of all significant minds who have influenced social life.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. LIONEL TAYLER.

VALUE AND THE SUFFICIENT REASON.

In the following remarks, which should be taken as suggestions rather than fully thought-out positions, it is sought to indicate some ways in which the Theistic significance of the idea of value or quality may admit of amplification in connexion with the principle of sufficient reason. Thoroughgoing Associationists of course reject the principle, asserting that all inquiry concerning absolute reality is futile. Yet they, like others, speak and act in ways that imply recognition of absolute differences in worth. Apart from the Associationist contention, I should propose—with some diffidence—that the world, whether as immediately given in experience or as scientifically reconstructed, may be interpreted as ultimate self-existing reality (the theory of Realism, whether Cyclic or Progressive) or as the expression of self-existent being that is itself perhaps beyond the grasp of articulate thought (the theory of Idealism, Relationless—with cyclic expression—or Progressive) or again as the created and sustained work of a self-existing, infinite Being (the theory of Theism, which usually is conceived as including Realistic and Idealistic, Progressive and Perfect elements¹), other interpretations being all perhaps of an eclectic and composite character. Now the principle of sufficient reason, reason being understood, I should mention, as including justification, seems to require that the self-existent possess absolute and indeed infinite value. For if value be set aside as ultimately unreal, the self-existent would appear to lack justification; on the other hand, if the ultimate reality of value be admitted, there appears to be no reason why any value should involve and be involved by self-existence while this failed to hold good of any higher value and the only value than which there can be no higher value is infinite. But, it might be suggested, all positive values may involve existence.² In that case, I should say, all negative values must exclude existence—evil and imperfection would be impossible; again, all existence and all relations would be unalterable, so that there could be no change and no activity, which in finite beings involves change; further, if all error have negative value, there could be no error, consequently no belief even in change or in negative values. Having then infinite value, the self-existent must be self-conscious and self-determined and that in the highest degree.³ And if so then Nonprogressive Realism and Nonprogressive Idealism alike, in both of which thought and will have only an intermittent existence, fail to satisfy the principle. Nor is it satisfied by the Progressive version of either theory, according to which the self-existent is moving towards ever fuller self-conscious realisation. For that which is at least in part unrealised and, if progressive to infinity, destined never to be realised fully cannot be infinite in quality nor can unrealised, that is non-existent, value involve the self-existence of that which is destined to realise it. Moreover, progress would seem to be impossible in the self-existent; for progress is essentially dependent upon time and this, so far from being of selfexistential nature, is probably largely subjective and relative, wherefore the self-existent must be regarded as essentially independent of it. Nor perhaps would it avail anything here to substitute for time the space-time of recent speculation, in which, as I understand,

¹ A point in its favour since none of the other interpretations can be regarded as wholly false.

² Or rather perhaps be existences, otherwise there must be an infinity not only of values but of each value—an infinity of infinities.

³ If self-existence involve infinite value, the converse appears to hold also—nothingness would lack justification, in fact the very supposition of nothingness seems involved in contradiction.

physical change is resolved into intersectings of world-lines in a four-dimension continuum; for if we must regard the continuum itself as at once finite and unbounded, that is, I suppose, as essentially returning upon itself, then this seems to exclude the conception of reality as essentially and enduringly progressive. Again, the view of the progressive movement as temporal but without beginning or end seems to involve the following additional difficulties. First, there can be no absolute differentiation of positive and negative values because no unique points where negative pass into positive values, infinite progression admitting of no such critical moments; hence if there be ultimately such a thing as positive value then all existence has such value, a position already dealt with above.⁴ Secondly, there must be a law of value-relativity, that is value must be essentially comparative or relative. But in that case self-existence, which is essentially positive or absolute, cannot be metaphysically grounded upon value and justification fails. The possibility of progress in the self-existent of either Realism or Idealism seems also to be opposed to cosmic fact; for when a stellar system perishes all its conscious achievement, if there has been any, must surely, according to either Realism or Idealism, perish too and be lost as a factor in further progress. Lastly, unless the self-existent be essentially and actually—not potentially—self-conscious and self-determined, in other words, unless conscious mind be original and fundamental, value is impossible; for nothing can be conceived as having value that has not been actualised in some sense with reference to such value and for the sake thereof.

It seems to me then that in various ways both Realism and Idealism fail to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason. Some indeed might argue that theories about ultimate reality can rationalise the relative only and not ultimate reality itself. But such an attitude involves the inconsistency in connexion with the actual recognition of values that was noted at the outset as accompanying metaphysical agnosticism. Surely too the unrationalisable cannot rationalise anything else. It might indeed be contended that there is a *petitio principii* in the above argument since the view expressed of rationalisation at the outset as necessarily including justification itself implies the reality of value. But the idea there rather was that apart from value self-existence lacks adequate ontological quality, in other words is essentially repugnant to reason. Further, might not the whole attempt to rationalise be said similarly to imply the reality of rationality? And the mind's craving is itself an argument for rationalisation—unless this argument also be a *petitio principii*. Besides, were the craving purely subjective, the objective element in experience must have proved far more intractable to reason. Again, the rejection by Realists of absolute value involves them, I should say, in additional difficulty. If absolute value be unreal and impossible, must not the idea of it be so too? Is it possible then to think that one has a thought that is impossible? And can an impossible thought be one belief in the reality and validity of which even those who in theory reject it are apparently unable to discard, since they are apparently unable in fact to treat distinctions of value as merely relative and subjective?

BUT, it may be objected, the contention that the self-existent must have infinite value involves the further position that the self-existent must be all-sufficient and all-inclusive and therefore allows no justification for or even possibility to the nonperfect and finite, let alone the imperfect and evil.

⁴ The pessimistic alternative that all values are negative values must be merely a logical alternative.

The objection is one that cannot perhaps receive any thoroughly satisfying answer. We may argue however that the necessity of the Infinite involves also (1) the possibility of the finite, (2) the power in the Former to convert that possibility into actuality. Further, if we admit the possibility of the finite, should we not admit the possibility also of imperfection, evil, suffering and even expect a finite world to be characterised in some measure by these defects? For a world so characterised, a world failing as a whole to attain the limited perfection or completeness conceivably attainable, might well be more fully representative of the nature of the finite than one possessing throughout such integrity as is possible to rather than characteristic of the finite; whence it would follow that an imperfect finite world would be truer to reality and so possess greater value than a finite world without defect—"faultily faultless." By an analogous argument we might justify gradation of excellence in the finite. Or perhaps we should in part at least connect all other imperfection in the finite world with the self-conscious finite's power of self-determination and should therefore regard all lesser imperfection as the indirect result of moral imperfection and failure. In other words, we should perhaps regard it as in the Divine provision constituting the necessary adjustment of the natural world to such eternally known imperfection and failure and its consequences in that the self-warping of intelligent beings necessitates an accommodated warping of nature too. Or we might perhaps regard it, though the supposition involves fresh difficulty, as, according to the same provision, affording occasion for moral self-realisation. If such ideas be unsound, the difficulty must be handled on other lines. On the same supposition however Idealism also fails to account for finite imperfection. For surely if imperfection be not characteristic of the finite, a world that is the finite expression of self-existent reality ought to be characterised by all the perfection possible to the finite, by outward symmetry, order, integrity and by inward repose, concord, satisfaction.⁶ Were only outward appearances in question the reply, irrefutable if unconvincing, might certainly be made that appearances are misleading owing to our utter inability to survey existence as a whole. But the consciousness of inward failure, suffering, guilt is strong against such a plea. The difficulty attaches, I think, not to Idealism only but also to such Realist systems as would grant the reality of value. Further, on the question of the relation between Finite and Infinite both Realism and Idealism are involved in greater difficulties. Relationless or Nonprogressive Idealism excepted, in all such interpretations the Infinite (or Transfinite) appears to be in one way or another inferior in reality, while in Nonprogressive Idealism this metaphysical inversion is only prevented through reduction of the relation between Finite and Infinite to metaphysical unintelligibility.

I WOULD next suggest that just as existence lacks sufficient reason unless possessing value, so value itself lacks sufficient reason unless somehow essentially timeless and imperishable. Senses no doubt there are in which particular values, positive and negative, can be effaced. Yet apart from such real or apparent qualifications, I would suggest, as proper to anything having true and absolute value, that it should never utterly and essentially pass away, I do not mean merely in its results but in itself considered as a part of reality, that its past actualisation whether by Divine or by finite action, could never become a matter of indifference—there must be indeed

⁶ Similarly the notion of successive cycles seems to involve that, as perfect, all are absolutely alike.

some mode in which even while yet unactualised it belongs to reality.* The essential timelessness of absolute value seems to follow too from the consideration that otherwise what mattered immensely at one time, for instance the activities and achievements of conscious life on the earth at the commencement of such life, would have ceased to matter at all at another time, namely the conclusion of the same, indeed that all the inconceivably great past is absolutely extinct and negligible, as will also be the now immensely important present and future as they too meet with extinction in the past, and this seems to involve reality in an essential perversity. But the timelessness or imperishableness of all value seems opposed to Realism, which cannot, I suppose, admit the timeless. It seems incompatible with Idealism as well. For in the case of Nonprogressive Idealism the Absolute, with its endless self-manifestations endlessly reabsorbed, would appear to be changeless itself, without gain or loss or even abiding record, while with Progressive Idealism reality may be too closely associated with time or space-time in the way already noted to allow an adequate essence to the timeless.

THE above view of particular values as belonging to timeless reality involves, I think, at the least that a conscious and everconscious record of them must remain.⁷ But if so then a record of all happenings and existences must remain because none is of quite neutral value in itself or without bearing on other values. One may indeed argue further that the knowable must be known, known consciously and known for ever, that any absence of such a fit complement would constitute a flaw in reality. This however involves again that the knowledge must be perfect, in other words must be the knowledge proper to an Infinite Mind. Yet on any theory except Theism all conscious knowledge of the real and actual, even the sum of all conscious knowledge in different and uncommunicating minds, is fragmentary, inadequate, intermittent and transient, far the greater part of it merely momentary. Further, the Mind whose knowledge of reality is complete and perfect must surely be conceived as also author and sustainer of the same.

P. J. HUGHESDON.

CITIES COMMITTEE.

MRS. ROBERT MORRIS SEYMOUR of Miami, Florida, U.S.A., sends the following STATE PLAN FOR FLORIDA with a letter expressing the desire to co-operate with Leplay House and appreciation of its point of view, especially as expressed in the books of Mr. Victor Branford. She continues, speaking of what we should call Civic Associations:—

"In another letter, to follow this, I will send you an outline of Co-operation that would strengthen the Community Organisation Plan and Program, and the work of Leplay House—this for your consideration. Many of these Civic Clubs are National organisations—they are fast becoming inter-national. If in this center as a kind of laboratory experiment—we can work out and establish a community program—it is not impossible to hope it can become a national and then international project—a project for the great middle class—a kind of leaven at work in the civic lump. It is my great desire to make this Community Organisation Plan and Program, Florida's contribution to Social Science—it will also be the work of a woman—it will help to direct the energies of women in other channels than political ones.

* The somewhat uncertain term "reality" should perhaps include all truth and all existence, though between finite truth and finite existence there is difference as well as agreement. The difficulty involved in the use as above of temporal expressions regarding the timeless may be in some measure unresolvable.

⁷ Further, the above suggests also the enduring existence of the authors of particular values—authors however only as self-determined, otherwise agents merely.

"It must be done in the spirit of art, the method of science, and the consecration of religion.

"HAVEN'T you a pamphlet called CREATIVE SPIRIT?*" That seems to convey the meaning of my point of view toward democratic Community Organisation."

MRS. SEYMOUR goes on to stress the need for—

"An education and training outside schools or universities, that will make citizenship center in *the building of cities fit to live in, and creating opportunities for 'the good life' where none exist.*

"THE city itself must become a university. There is no hope for us in this country, unless we can get entirely away from the idea of leadership—personal leadership—to the idea of a *program*—a plan of action—that can be taught—and explained—and interpreted—until everybody in the community knows *something* about it, and gradually each citizen becomes a part of it—as every musician in the orchestra becomes a part of the program—all the musicians are not playing *all* the time—nor are they thinking about it *all* the time, nor do they understand it in the same way—nevertheless they are all a part of the program. Other people write books, and discuss Social Organisation in conferences and conventions and university groups. My point of view comes from actual experience in working out a technique for Community Organisation, and close contact with the needs of the people."

STATE PLAN FOR FLORIDA.

FLORIDA FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS, 1922-23.

REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED EDUCATION.

MADAM Chairman and Members of the F.F.W.C.:

At the urgent request of Miss Skinner, your Chairman consented to fill the unexpired term of Mrs. Edgar T. Lewis, with the understanding that the work should be to develop a well correlated program for the Division Chairmen to use as a basis for co-operation in town, county and state-wide work, and a body of reliable information made available for the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs.

YOUR chairman spent the past four months in New York City studying "City and Regional Planning" with Professor Patrick Geddes of Edinburgh and Bombay; personally visited the state, county and city parks and playgrounds, and investigated the most modern methods of education. In February and March your Chairman joined with Mrs. D. P. Council and the State Committee of Public Welfare in a survey of state institutions, visiting most of the cities and counties of the state.

As the result of careful study and investigation your chairman recommends that the department of applied education put all its activities on a county organisation basis.

WHAT finer work could there be for the Federation of Women's Clubs in the state of Florida than to assist in this problem and work out a great co-operative program for the development of the state based on a thorough and scientific study of county government and county affairs?

ENGLAND, France and Ireland are county states. Poets, travellers, artists, writers, always speak of Kent, Surrey, Devonshire; Normandy, Brittany, Provence. All the world knows the lakes of Killarney and County Kerry. Each county has its definite character, individuality and interest. Florida could rival those countries in beauty and attractiveness if public opinion could be aroused, and a special study made of local resources and local needs, submitting this gathered information to the experts for final consideration.

ALL the world knows about the big hotels in Florida, the hunting, fishing, yachting, bathing, offered to a world seeking health and pleasure, but very few citizens of Florida know the resources of their own county, much less the state. There is need for actual facts, an intensive study of each county.

THE great asset of Florida is its climate, its out-of-door life all the year round. We advertise the climate, which is the gift of God, and we allow ugliness and destruction to run riot throughout the state. A great responsibility rests upon the citizens of this state to make their work of building cities and developing regions harmonise

*CREATIVE SPIRIT in PAPERS FOR THE PRESENT Series. (Leply House Press.)

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with the perfection of the climate. There is opportunity in Florida for the creating and development of a gracious, generous, hospitable country life, and the building of garden villages, towns and cities that shall be built right from start to finish. It offers an unparelled opportunity to city planners, landscape architects, foresters, highway engineers and gardeners. There is need for research, investigation, education of public opinion and public interest; agriculture, horticulture, country planning, city planning, highway planning, county parks, landscape architecture are all of the greatest importance in the future development of Florida. They must be under expert direction in a big, state-wide way, developing a feeling for art and beauty among all the people.

With this end in view your chairman recommends that the division of education, the division of illiteracy, the division of home economics, the division of national resources, the division of forestry, the division of bird protection, the division of parks, should work in close co-operation on a county organisation basis, making use of the county federations and clubs throughout the state.

The plan is to bring these divisions together in one big program for a five or ten or twenty-five year development. Your chairman suggests taking the county as a unit, securing all possible information as to education, health, public welfare, recreation and legislation so far developed for county organisation, steadfastly taking one problem at a time until Florida has the best county government, the best county school system, the best county organisation for public welfare, child care and protection, public health, and conservation that can be found anywhere. Begin by stimulating interest in the study of the county, its natural resources, its forests, streams, springs, native trees, tropical trees and shrubs; where, from a regional point of view, highways should be built, city, county and state parks developed, open spaces conserved. Assist in creating public sentiment for an agricultural building at the state capitol, to house all the agencies necessary for such work, the state chemist, the state geologist, a display of minerals, fish, gardens, forestry. The state geologist is unequipped; there is no state department or bureau or commission that has to do with forestry; no official survey of the state has been made in forestry, the legislature makes no appropriation for this work, this great asset of the state of Florida. The women can give the most effective service by beginning with their own locality, study the trees and shrubs, the plants and trailing vines; make pilgrimages through their own county and then to other counties, finding all that is of interest and value in their own environment. Strengthen interest in the department of agriculture and the state farm at Raiford as an experimental station for forestry, to show the people what can be done with state conservation when under scientific direction.

Your chairman submits the following outline for a state plan for Florida as subject matter for study, research and discussion.

STATE PLAN FOR FLORIDA.

1. STATE parks, state highways, state water power.

2. REGIONAL plan.

(a) Emphasising regional highways, conserving every natural feature of scenic beauty, or possibility of development by landscape art or town planning. Beaches, canals, submerged lands, waterfronts, rivers, lakes, springs. (Working for co-operation between towns and counties.)

(b) Careful choice of trees and shrubs to give definite individuality and character to each county and region, making the most of small differences in the contour of the land and landscape.

(c) Regional surveys. Industrial surveys. Agriculture. Horticulture. Geology. Botany. Regional geography. Regional products. (Co-operation between counties.)

(d) COUNTY parks. No one should undertake actual park design without expert skill, cultivated taste and training in the subject. It is of the utmost importance to Florida to have artists trained in park building and design. There should be a county park commission appointed in each county. Park development must be established under state law and have official sanction.

3. CIRCULATION within the Region: Transportation of passengers and good highway connections—all travelled roads—except those of steam and rails. Steam and electric right-of-way. Recreational opportunities—not local, but big regional parks and reserves.

4. TOWN planning. In every locality a town plan, stimulating interest in making every village and the entire countryside attractive and individual. Interest the county

in developing a beautiful approach to each town and village ; an artistic and individual planting of each schoolyard and playground ; landscape gardening around churches ; make the railway station a central point for beautiful planting. Use the rare and beautiful Florida vines.

To accomplish this means, directed effort and an aroused and intelligent public opinion, make careful studies of the possibilities in regional planning, what dangers to avoid, what possibilities to help along. No state in the union would or could benefit so much from the highest skill in horticulture, landscape architecture, and town planning as would Florida. All this work should be in the nature of a preliminary survey, making sure we know what to do before we do it.

For personal study and public discussion the following report may be of service :

HOME ECONOMICS.

THE Metropolitan Museum of New York City is taking the lead in an effort to bring home economics and the study of art in closer relationship. The entire federation should work to strengthen the art department of the Florida Women's College, so that it would reach the high standard set by the Sophie Newcomb College at New Orleans, which attracts students from all over the country.

EDUCATION.

THE Lincoln School, Teacher's College, Columbia University, is a central laboratory for experiments towards a better curriculum throughout the public school system. Every subject, every method, is being tested, evaluated. Fundamental changes are taking place in the teaching of arithmetic, reading, spelling, geography and the social sciences.

THE pre-school child has become the center of interest in education. Nursery schools. Play Schools. Nursery gardens. The city and country schools offer important subjects for study and discussion. Bulletins are published by the Bureau of Educational Experiments, 165 West Twelfth Street, New York. The bulletin on "Play-things" and "A Catalogue of Play Equipment" are specially recommended as useful to mothers of young children.

Respectfully submitted,

MRS. ROBERT MORRIS SEYMOUR,

Chairman.

It is of great interest to all supporters of the Civic point of view to find such a development on foot in the U.S.A., and any possible co-operation with this movement would be most welcome. We hope that Mrs. Seymour is coming to England in the Spring of this year.

S. B.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN.

THERE came from Chicago, in the late nineties of the last century, a book by an author of name as arresting as the title of his treatise. It was the now celebrated *THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS* by Thorstein Veblen. The book offered an account at once descriptive and interpretative of contemporary civilisation in its outstanding features as we see, or fail to see them, in the West. The author, though a professor of economics, yet wielded a manifest mastery of psychology and anthropology also. The resources of these latter sciences were brought to bear from the standpoint of the currently established doctrine of each. The author's psychology was that of the school now known as Behaviourist in America. It analyses conduct in terms of impulses and motives that rise into consciousness, if at all, only on self-critical reflection in the cool aftermath of action ; and even then but in disguised and distorted form. (This "behaviourist" psychology becomes Freudian when it stresses the sex factor in conduct.) Mr. Veblen's anthropology was of the school (one might call it Tylorian or Spencerian), which sees civilised man as cloaked in a thin veneer of historic culture, washed off or painted on by the underlying savage according as primitive impulses and animal instincts dictate.

MR. VEBLEN'S THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS was made notable not only by his skill in handling an unusual combination of economics, psychology and anthropology, but also by a remarkable and original style, uniting the rotund dignity of eighteenth century prose with the solemnity of academic philosophy, and then achieving the incredible feat of quickening his whole treatise by a mordant humour and a pitiless irony.

IN a highly condensed presentation the thesis of Veblen's THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS would run somewhat as follows: The earliest subdivision of labour, arising out of and superimposed on that of sex, is a division of occupations into those that are of the nature of exploit and prowess, and those that are of the nature of drudgery. The corresponding social types are characterised by, on the one hand, audacity and predaciousness, and on the other by timidity and submission. The correlative grouping is into a higher class engaged in "honorific occupations," and a lower class engaged in "humilific occupations." The military occupation is honorific, not only because it serves to display audacity and prowess, but also because by affording opportunity for the accumulation of loot, it provides means for a peaceful occupation that is also highly honorific—the "performance of leisure." And with the growth of civilisation, the increase of wealth, the further subdivision and specialisation of labour, numerous refinements of honorific occupation become possible. The performance of leisure, for instance, at first only undertaken by the superior person himself, may be increasingly assisted by others, wife, family, and increasing circles of dependents, at length quite vicariously performed—as by engaging a stalwart Hercules to serve as a Footman. Moreover, this vicarious performance of leisure has the further advantage of setting free the Master Man himself to satisfy those universal human instincts of workmanship, which, in the higher class scheme of life, tend to be countered by the exigencies of honorific leisure. Having taken adequate precautions against the derogation of his gentlemanly status (primarily, by the copious, regular, and manifest consumption of costly goods, in his person, and if possible also vicariously, by his attendants and household), the man of higher class, now clearly distinguished by this process of "conspicuous waste," permits himself to relax from the performance of leisure, and engage in occupations that otherwise might mark him with the taint of drudgery. Particularly is this the case when the industrial system reaches the stage of development where it bases itself on a money economy. A change from the system of payment in kind to payment in money means a revolution in the operative conventions of the industrial system. It involves great possibilities of wealth acquisition by audacious manipulation of the symbols and tokens of industrial values. Here, in fact, are new and abundant opportunities for achievements of exploit and prowess (cunning increasingly aiding force); and their gains consequently admit of the creation and multiplication of new occupations, honorific and other. These later refinements in the progress of civilisation are broadly spoken of as *Financiering*.

IN a magisterial sequence of treatises published at short intervals, Mr. Thorstein Veblen has continued and developed his descriptive account and interpretative view of Occidental civilisation in its main contemporary forms.* The latest of his many books is entitled *ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP*,

*THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS; THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA; THE NATURE OF PEACE; THE INSTINCT OF WORKMAN'S LIFE; IMPERIAL GERMANY AND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION; THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION; THE VESTED INTERESTS AND THE COMMON MAN; THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM; ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP. Several of these are now published in England by Allen & Unwin.

published by Huebsch in New York in 1923, and more recently by Allen and Unwin in London. It submits a descriptive analysis and estimation of recent and current modes in the most developed types of Financiering, more particularly as observable in America. How far Mr. Veblen's account is verifiable need not for the moment be asked. Apart from the questions of conformity to fact and adequacy of range and scope, there is the notable event that an analysis, begun nearly a generation ago in the light of "behaviourist" psychology, Veblen's Spencerian anthropology, and current economics, is here, in Mr. Veblen's latest book, brought perhaps to the very limit of interpretative insight capable of development by these orders of science. ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP presents a picture of the modern world as remade by men whose practices correspond (unwittingly) to theories explicit or implicit in Economics, Behaviourist, Psychology, and Spencerian Anthropology.

UNDER the title of "a famous American's warning" the HERALD recently devoted a long article to Mr. Veblen's doctrine. The following account of the main thesis of ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP is taken from the HERALD's Summary:

THE established codes of law and morals, and with them the habitual assumptions of current political practice, are increasingly in conflict with the real facts of the developing industrial system; and this conflict between the forces and methods of production and the legal restraining conditions of production, will in time intensify to such a pitch that either the institutions must change or production (and with it human existence) will become impossible.

THE essence of the accepted code in law and morals is the Right of Property in the means of production and the Freedom of all to "pursue happiness" on the basis of this right without State interference or public constraint. The Individual, his Rights, his Liberties, and his Responsibilities—these are the entities around which the whole of our accepted institutions were built.

IN England in 1688 and in America in 1776 these assumptions corresponded closely with the state of social existence. There were few men then absolutely without property in land or in the means of production. These last might only be the slender kit of an independent craftsman, but as the bulk of production was in the hands of him and his like the law and morality that secured him had a valid claim to secure the greatest good of the greatest number.

BUT while the code has remained and gathered sanctity from age and force from habituation, the industrial facts have been transformed beyond recognition. Not only has the independent craftsman gone—and his kit of tools with him—the small manufacturer into which he grew (if he were fortunate) has gone too. And the limited liability company, owning the big factory into which the small workshop ultimately grew, that, too, has grown into the Big Business which has lost its independence in a "merger" or "combine," and become subjected in turn to the control of financiering interests.

THE owner has ceased to be a worker in the productive sense, and the worker has become something for which the law has no provision and morality no category.

THESE facts carry with them consequences. Even in the days of small manufacture it occasionally arose that it was advantageous for the craftsman to limit his output. More usually he went wider afield and sought a new

market. The theory of the accepted code is that the free play of competition will establish an equitable equilibrium between competing egoisms—and on the basis of small production there was truth in the supposition. Now that free competition has worked itself out into its logical opposite—a whole hierarchy of monopolies and combinations for the suppression of competition—the theory of the law and the accepted code becomes a grim and mocking barrier to defend monopoly against every consideration based upon equity.

NOTHING shows this better than the conflict (as Veblen expresses it) between the needs of production and the interests of salesmanship. Originally the capital of a business meant the cash-value of the plant or stock; nowadays it means a sum calculated from the annual earning power of the business in terms of the current average rate of interest. And as the earning power of each successful business grows more and more to depend upon a monopoly either of materials, of the market, or of salesmanship, and expensive modern advertising, earning power depends in increasing measure less upon the production of goods than upon systematic curtailment of production.

THE above epitome of Mr. Veblen's latest book by a *HERALD* reviewer would seem to be a fair statement of the author's central thesis in *ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP*; but how much it loses, when Veblen's irony is translated into pedestrian prose! A word, however, should be said about the financial aspect of the thesis. The current system of financiering, Mr. Veblen sees as a means "to get rich quick," which increasingly draws into the snare of a masked predation the cleverer and more forceful men from well-nigh all classes. Financiering in this analysis is to be understood as the art of acquiring expertise in a complex process. The purposes of financiering, as practised by its greater masters, may be broadly viewed as: (a) to inflate the money-earning capacity of a business, a concession, a right, or other marketable entity; (b) to capitalise in paper securities, this earning power, at the top of its curve; (c) to "unload on the public," which means converting these paper securities into legal tender, actual or potential, by ingenious combinations of the Banking System, the Stock Exchanges, the Press; (d) to "invest" the proceeds in securities calculated to yield an ample and steady income to "absentee owners."

IN sum, the view of contemporary civilisation in the West presented by Mr. Veblen's remarkable series of studies running through and beyond the two decades that have witnessed the world crisis of the War, comes nearer, perhaps to a sociological interpretation of current life and affairs than can be found elsewhere. But what a reflection on the body of professed sociologists that they should have left this supreme task of describing and interpreting the characteristic processes of contemporary civilisation in the West to a professor of Economics!

V. B.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

STICKS AND STONES: A Study of American Architecture and Civilisation: by Lewis Mumford. (Boni & Liveright, New York. 1924. \$2.50 net.)

UNDER this title Mr. Lewis Mumford reviews the course of American architecture from the time of the first settlers to the present day, and suggests a remedy for the perplexities in which architecture finds itself to-day. Unlike most books on architecture, it is very readable. Mr. Mumford's appreciation of the various forces and influences that have shaped American architecture is a very just one. He marshals his facts with a high degree of skill, presenting us with a picture which is vivid and realistic in the extreme. To that extent it is difficult to imagine the task he set himself being better done. The chapter entitled *THE IMPERIAL FACADE* in which Mr. Mumford considers the work of the great professors of the classic style, Messrs. McKim, Burnham, Carriere and Hastings, is particularly brilliant. The title of the chapter is exceptionally happy for it sums up perfectly the achievement of American architecture between the years 1890 until the outbreak of the war. It is happy, for it brings out clearly what the classicists achieved—a facade—which concealed a mass of social, economic and industrial putrefaction. This architecture was built on a rotten foundation "Historically," remarks Mr. Mumford, "the imperial monument and the slum tenement go hand in hand."

MR. MUMFORD recognises that because these achievements are built on a rotten foundation they are insecure. The revival of architecture is being defeated by the growth of industrialism. "In that part of architecture which lies outside of the purlieu of our commercial system—I mean the prosperous country homes and college buildings and churches and municipal institutions—a tradition of good building and tactful design has been established. At this point, unfortunately the scope of the architect becomes narrowed: the forces that create the majority of our buildings lie quite outside the cultivated fields in which he works. Through the mechanical organisation of the entire milieu, the place of architecture has become restricted. It is not merely business buildings that are affected by the inherent instability of enterprises to which profit and rent have become ideal ends: the same thing is happening to the great mass of houses and apartments which are designed for sale. Scarcely any element in our architecture and city planning is free from the encroachment, direct or indirect, of business enterprise. The chief influence in eliminating the architect from the great bulk of our building is the machine itself."

SUCH an analysis might lead us to suppose that when Mr. Mumford came to consider the remedy for this state of things he would demand a restriction of the use of machinery and a radical change in the idea of business enterprise. But Mr. Mumford looks in a different direction for a solution. He thinks that the gasoline engine and electric motor will shift the centre of gravity of industry from the large factory to the small workshop, when groups of workers would manufacture again for a local instead of a national market. For my own part I feel it to be insufficient. It seems to me that something far more fundamental is wanted. A change in the current, it seems to me, can only follow a great spiritual awakening; the rise of an anti-industrial movement that will break through the bonds of mechanism and mammonism liberating the spirit of man. And there is every reason to believe that such a movement will become a world-wide phenomenon during the next decade or so for the awakening has already come in Germany where in the universities and in connection with the Youth Movement

Mediaevalism and anti-industrialism are making great strides. The significance of the Gandhi movement in India and the movement against industrialism in Eastern Europe also should not be overlooked.

MR. MUMFORD, placing all his faith entirely upon the change he anticipates will follow the development of electricity and the gasoline engine, sees in garden city development and regional planning the one hope of architecture, and he is so firm in this belief that he discusses the architecture of the skyscrapers which of late years American architects have treated so successfully as mere scene painting. But is such an attitude a right one? We may agree with Mr. Mumford that from a social point of view skyscrapers are undesirable. But it nevertheless remains a fact that there is nothing in architecture to-day that is so much alive as the architecture of these skyscrapers. I was much impressed by this fact on a recent visit to America. I think that instead of depreciating this architecture Mr. Mumford should have accepted it, basing his predictions of the future upon a frank recognition of the fact that architecture has strangely blossomed amid the most adverse and undesirable conditions, for there are two ways in which this phenomenon may be regarded. We may regard this architecture as the expression of the skyscraper, or we may regard the architecture and the skyscraper as things fundamentally different in their nature, which, though acknowledging different starting points and moving towards different goals, have for the time being become accidentally associated.

THE latter I believe to be the true interpretation. The skyscraper we must condemn, but we must accept the architecture because it has an enormous propaganda value. It might be termed propaganda architecture, because it is of enormous value as an agency for the education of public taste, which in turn will react to create a public that will demand real architecture. Its aim, I take it, is not to express what exists but to foreshadow what may exist under different social and economic conditions. It appears to me that when Ruskin said that all architecture is the expression of national life and character he only expressed a half truth, for great architecture like great literature is prophetic—Greek architecture did not express Greek civilisation in the sense that Greek civilisation ever attained the degree of order expressed in the Parthenon. On the contrary, Greek civilisation was capitalistic and suffered from a great deal of disorder. In the same way it may be claimed that Gothic architecture postulated an ideal of society that was never fulfilled, and looking at skyscraper architecture in this way it seems to me that it is prophetic of the coming reaction against industrialism. How else are we to explain the fact that the tendency of design in the more recent skyscrapers is towards standards that are frankly Mediaeval. This fact suggests that the architects who are responsible for these skyscrapers have their eyes fixed on the Middle Ages. They may or may not be fully alive to the sociological implications of their work. But it is not without significance that this latest development in American architecture should synchronise with the rise of Mediaevalism and anti-industrialism in Germany. It is in my opinion in this direction that a solution of the problems of architecture will eventually be found. It is not true, as Mr. Mumford says, that "the Romantics have never fully faced the social and economic problems that attend their architectural solutions," since so far as my knowledge of architects extends they are the only ones who seriously think about social and economic problems at all. And because they do they understand that industrialism has no bottom to it, and must, like a seven days' wonder, come to an end. This explains why they held on so long where appearances are against them. It is architects who don't think about social questions who are content to swim with the stream.

A. J. PENTY.

THE COMMON WEAL: by the Right Hon. Herbert Fisher, M.P.
(Clarendon Press. 7s. 6d. net.)

IF the world were prepared to be ruled by wisdom it could not do better than appoint Mr. Fisher as universal dictator. His Stevenson Lectures on THE COMMON WEAL reveal a mind so full of information on political subjects, so comprehensive in its outlook on civic and international affairs, and so sane and balanced in its judgments, that the muddle and turmoil of actual social and political life is made to appear positively ridiculous. Here is one who could put it all straight if only he were allowed; and that not in any iron-handed and overbearing way, but with quiet indications of the place for everything and convincing statements of the best method of getting everything in its place. Alas! the world is not likely to make Mr. Fisher its philosopher-king.

THE book disclaims in the preface any pretensions to being a systematic contribution to Political Philosophy. Nevertheless it covers a wide field, and a glance at the index, even after the book has been read, almost takes one's breath away, so great is the variety of the subjects which receive treatment. Take, for example, the first few entries under "A": Ability, graduations of; Abraham; Absolutist; Acland, Mr. Arthur; Adolescent education; Æschylus; Africa, partition of. This mixture of things philosophical, literary, historical and political is a fair sample of the contents; and between A and Z the subjects which come under the observation of Mr. Fisher's acute intelligence are almost bewildering in their variety.

To follow the author through the book is to feel that one is becoming so well-informed and so saturated with political wisdom that it requires an effort to indulge any misgivings as to whether one is getting just the light we need on the actual issues before us as citizens to-day. Yet occasionally one is stirred to make the effort, and then there comes a sense of disappointment which seems somehow a little unjust to so competent a guide. Thus, under "The Ethics of Wealth" we have several eloquent and penetrating pages on the necessity of generating a sense of partnership between employer and employed. "The world will not be healed," we read, with appreciation of the truth and wisdom of the words, "by gentle manners and kind thoughts and educated ideals alone, so long as any great fundamental social injustice is allowed to persist." And we are led to the conclusion as regards one of these injustices, that "It is a cardinal requisite of social progress that this evil of unemployment should be removed. Even in Great Britain, where the problem is hardest, it is not unmanageable. A sound system of insurance by industries would dispose of 85 per cent. of the unemployment in this country at a cost which would be repaid over and over again by the removal of a malignant source of unrest and bitterness, and by the revival of the old and salutary belief that it is the duty of every worker to give to his work the best that is in him." Who would think, reading these smooth-running sentences, that the proposal of insurance by industries raises some of the most complex and controversial questions in the industrial and political world?

BUT though Mr. Fisher may make some things appear too easy, he deserves our thanks for the sheer variety and interest of the topics with which he deals, for his clear analysis of many of our social problems, and for his insistence on our facing the facts and renouncing prejudice and illusion in our pursuit of the common weal.

A. J. W.

MOTHER AND SON: by C. Gasquoine Hartley. (Nash & Grayson. 1923.)

IN this psychological study of the development of the secret life of the child, the author, a devout disciple of Freud, has embodied in a popular and readable form many of the conclusions arrived at by modern psychoanalysts. The work is pleasantly free from technical terms and scientific formula, but with regret it must be added that it appears also to be uninspired by the scientific spirit. Mrs. Gasquoine Hartley is far too apt to sentimentalise and agonise over the child, and to regard as invariably dynamic elements which, in the minds of many children, remain for ever latent potentialities. Thus, though no one would deny the harm wrought in the lives of some children by the inferiority complex, most parents and teachers would, I think, agree that the majority of modern children have little to fear from it.

MUCH that Mrs. Gasquoine Hartley says cannot fail to be of interest to those concerned with the upbringing of children, and to them the study of the 1st and 2nd parts of the book is especially to be commended; but the value of the whole work would be greatly enhanced if an endeavour had been made to distinguish between the conclusions arrived at by ingenious speculation and those based on ascertained facts.

IN the latter part of the book the author fails to convince us that she has any intimate knowledge of the schools of to-day, and her championship of old-fashioned methods is somewhat surprising.

IN conclusion, we cannot help expressing surprise that Mrs. Gasquoine Hartley, who has devoted such careful study to the psychology of the child, should not have deemed it necessary to study the psychology of the parent for whom primarily the book is intended. Had she done so she would surely have avoided the didactic and slightly patronising mode of address which must inevitably antagonise the very readers the book is intended to help.

V. L.

THE DIVINE KINGDOM WITHIN THE EMPIRE: by Rowland Wormell. (George Routledge & Sons Ltd.).

THIS in its limitations and in its teaching together is a remarkable book. In the early part of the book the writer appears to be an exponent of that exploded creed Erastianism. The state church of England is to become the Imperial Church and the question appears to be how best to accomplish this result. But when we read on we find that the assumptions of the "state," even that central and essential doctrine of Sovereignty, are not to pass unquestioned. From an incisive chapter dealing with this point our author passes on to criticise the early church for its compromise with the Roman Empire and ends with an enquiry into the conception of the "Kingdom of Heaven" as conceived in the teaching of Christ, the synoptic writers and St. Paul. In his epilogue Mr. Wormell passes on to consider modern contributions to the making of a better world and considers the position of economics, politics, ethics, and "pure science" in this respect, with none of which is he satisfied. "Science," he complains, "has given us no synoptic view of the world of reality as a whole." It is interesting to note that this writer feels the need for Sociology, though he is apparently ignorant that any synoptic effort has been made and of its very name. He takes refuge in the hope that Christianity will lead men to lighten the burden of our civilisation by better co-operation, and his last words state that it is for the Church of England to perform this task in the British Empire.

S. B.

THE NEW THEATRE AND CINEMA OF SOVIET RUSSIA : by
Huntly Carter. (Chapman & Dodd Ltd. 1924.)

GEOGRAPHERS have necessarily always appreciated how much they depend upon their explorers and travellers, and from earliest days to latest Everest climbers ; but Sociologists here lag behind. In our ranks it is with difficulty that even the few surveyors of regions or cities can find standing-room or at best recognition of, at any rate, some minor usefulness amid the more abstract-minded majority ; and this although so obviously but continuing and developing a long-established tradition of culture, even historical and literary, as well as geographic, naturalistic and social. The anthropologist indeed, especially if returned from some sufficiently remote Pacific isle, or otherwise isolated and simple society, more readily gets his innings ; but even the recovery of elements of our own earlier culture-heritage—whether by spade, as from Schliemann to Evans, or through interpretative scholarship as from Fustel de Coulanges to Frazer, has been rather forced upon us by those of classical or biblical traditions or controversies than encouraged by ourselves.

OUR schools of learning, whether human geographers, anthropologists, scholars or divines, are as yet too little concerned with the actual life of civilisation to-day, and still less observant, much less interpretative, of its component societies in their ferments and transformations ; but are we sociologists as yet much better ? Consider the French Revolution. Thanks to Carlyle and other vivid historians, mostly writing a generation or more after—and still more since British Liberalism quietly took over so many of its practical results—we have all nowadays some idea of its nature and significance. We see, too, how little these were clearly realised in its own time and especially in our own countries. But are we not nowadays repeating the same blindness, at any rate continuing the same dullness, as regards that far more thorough-going Revolution of these recent years of which Russia has been the focus, and now alternately conspires and threatens to be the world centre ? For how few books have we, in all our western languages, to tell us, not simply what has happened, but what this terrific political and social overturn really was, is, and means ? And of these how very few with wide personal observations, beyond that of the bright press correspondent, and thus towards social interpretation as well ?

HERE, however, in Mr. Carter, we have one of these much needed but too rare sociological travellers, even explorers ; since he passes beyond the past external events of which we have all heard so much and searches into the mind of Russia to-day, interpreting this, from its expression in art and drama. Our older generation has been familiar with the Russian novel ; and understood this as no mere pastime-reading, but as an expression of the soul travail of a great people, straining in bondage. Well ; here at length is the corresponding introduction for us into a new phase of this mind, to us strange and foreign, yet so deeply human too. Old bonds are broken, and not only new forms of social activity, but new moods and dreams of the human spirit are now manifest. The sociological question is thus not whether we approve them, like them, or dislike them ; but what they are and mean : and this is where Mr. Carter's fresh descriptive and interpretative approach, by way of contemporary art expression, is of high interest and value ; and not simply to the theatre-lover as such but also to the student of contemporary social evolution in general.

MACKENZIE WALLACE's long famous book on Russia is necessarily now mainly of historic interest ; while even Prof. Mavor's admirable and

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comprehensive volumes date from before the War ; and, despite the acute interpretations of recent events his forthcoming new edition contains, these cannot but be limited by the official exclusion of so dreaded a critic. But here now is one of the too few concretely observant members of our own group, who, despite all difficulties, in their way comparable to any explorer's, has for these good many years past been quietly going to and fro between Hampstead and Moscow, describing, interpreting, and even frankly criticising ; so that one at first wonders how he has got through so many doors usually or readily closed to ordinary enquirers and correspondents. Yet his secret is plain : instead of the usual political and cultural prepossessions, one way or other, which these commonly bring, and which either way serve mostly to maintain or defend our usual non-understanding of Russia, let alone its Revolution, Mr. Carter has applied the magic keys of his dramatic experience and insight, criticism and appreciation. His vividly descriptive and well-illustrated book is thus a veritable theatre of theatres, a cinema of cinemas too : and his accounts of the Russian stage, in its amazingly Protean recent and current evolution are of vivid interest ; too varied, too phantasmagoric, for even the faintest outline here ; but thus all the more worth careful reading, and this at every level of theatric interest, simple to complex.

YET for the sociological reader, the interest will be found no less keen ; for the book is also that of a true sociologist, full of insight into the present fermentation of the Russian mind, and thus interpretative alike of its expression by the artist and of his reaction upon the people. It thus throws lights upon the mind of the modern artist in more countries than in Russia, indeed on that of many of the younger generation in all countries, not even excepting the most comfortably conservative ones. Mr. Carter is indeed an example of the contemporary sociologist at his brightest ; for he has found his way to the very greatest of social melting-pots (perhaps of mental witch-pots also), and shrewdly peeped in, to his own enlightenment, and ours.

P. G.

ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE : by H. P. Fairchild. Macmillan Co., New York. (8s. net.)

It is a good development in education to recognise the necessity of giving to young people some introduction to the study of life in human society, and to endeavour to provide it. Many attempts will be made before the comprehensive and human presentation is ready. It must be comprehensive in that it omits no aspect of life that influences society, and it must be human in that it presents an unconscious evolution in a manner that avoids the conventional phrases so loved of third-rate sociologists. Professor Fairchild's text book for High School pupils in the United States is to be welcomed as attempting to supply a need, but it is curiously contradictory. In one sense it is too advanced in using technical and professional phrases not suitable to young people, and in another sense it is too simple on account of its somewhat childish illustrations.

THE chapter on Religions, which takes account of other religions than Christianity, is good as far as it goes ; but the whole realm of Art—drama, poetry, architecture, etc.—is omitted. There are chapters on Production, Rights, Wages, Population and the State which give a certain amount of comprehension of these complex subjects.

E. M. W.

SCHOOL FOR JOHN AND MARY: by Elizabeth Banks. Putnam. (7s. 6d.)

THIS is a tale of enthusiastic democratic young parents who after five years of Canadian life return to England and attempt to live up to their democratic ideals, and to bring up their children on the same lines, believing that England has changed since the war. It is a treatment of the question of caste in relation to education. Though coming from "good" families with generations of public school tradition behind them, they determine that their children, John and Mary, shall go to the local County Council School with the children of bricklayers and dustmen. They continue the experiment for about a year and then return to Canada.

THE author has given us a clear presentation of the problem, but no clear solution. We have a vivid picture of old-fashioned relatives who are amazed and horror-stricken at this unheard of action, of scandalised friends and neighbours whose reaction is an infliction of complete social ostracism on John and Mary and their parents, of other devoted parents whose love for the public schools is such that they are ready to sacrifice everything to send and keep their children there. We are shown, too, something of the misery and chains of the slums, of overcrowded, one-roomed homes, of bright children whose only hope of a free place in a secondary school and further education is taken from them because a brain cannot work in an undernourished, over-tired body, and one cannot do home-lessons when mother has to use the only table for the ironing which brings in the daily bread. We see school buildings, unfriendly, inconvenient, insanitary, as if designed expressly to hinder and repress the growing child. These pictures are perhaps exaggerated, but a certain amount of exaggeration is good and necessary to bring out clearly the points at issue, and to give a jerk to those who will not think.

THE only untrue representation is that of the teachers in the elementary schools. To be fair the author should have chosen a typical elementary school with mediocre human teachers. The Arlington is a place staffed with idealists and scholars who spend their lives in devoted service and high thoughts, and every single teacher, of this or any other school, that we meet in these pages is one of the same elect type. There are, of course, some idealists among the ranks of teachers; there are many who began their school life as idealists and through the pressure of drab material surroundings and the continual frustration of their better selves have become mere machines; there are many more who take up their work from various motives which are not idealistic. Mrs. Banks' admiration for her teachers is so whole-hearted and uncritical that her sense of humour seems to desert her and she degenerates at times into absurd sentimentalism.

THIS vivid passionate attack on caste in education and the sincere appeal for a new outlook is most stimulating and should open its readers' eyes to a very real problem. The experiment of the parents of John and Mary does not however produce any helpful result. John is a very thoughtful young man of ten and his dictum on difficulties he has to face while undergoing this experiment is "It doesn't sound sense!" and his parents finally agree with him, give it up at that, pack up, and go back to Canada—leaving the class system and its complications behind them, as they think. All they can do practically to reform the English schools is to finance two or three parliamentary candidates who are to fight by the usual political methods for schools that will be fit for all children, prospective peer and dustman alike.

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MRS. BANKS seems to realise without expressing it very clearly that the factor that makes the public school classes cling with such determination to public school education for their children is not so much conscious approval of the culture they impart nor fear that at other schools their children's manners might be corrupted—the reasons most often given in answer to enquiries—as the force of custom and tradition that insists that as things have been so they shall remain. If she were concentrating her attention a little less on the schools and the children, she would realise further that the educational aspect is only one aspect of the situation; that there is the fact of caste in education simply because there is the fact of caste in social life, and that the upper classes cling to a public school education because such an education hands on the tradition of class distinctions and fortifies the class organisation. It is the self-preserving impulse of the "ruling class."

THERE is also another idea that underlies the general conception of education in this country that might be more clearly recognised. From the time when the elementary education of the children of the poor began in the hands of philanthropic societies in the early part of last century, such education has been looked on as a charity to the poor and not as a right. This idea is of course fortified not only by the general class organisation of society but also by the fact that even after a century of development, at the end of which it is understood that every child must receive a certain minimum of instruction, the public elementary schools are thought of as being paid for not by the parents of the children who attend them but by those who also pay to send their own children elsewhere.

THESE half-conscious underlying ideas are more serious obstacles in the way of a truly democratic educational system than any difficulties of bad housing conditions, badly equipped school buildings, and badly supported teachers, and reform cannot come only through political agitation. So, though Mrs. Banks has not shown us any ready remedy for the troubles she describes, we have to thank her for a book which will certainly focus attention on our elementary schools and cannot fail to make everyone who reads it think about them. There is hope, too, that its story form will result in its being read by many people like the characters in the story, who would probably never look at a work on education as such, but whose ideas badly need shaking.

E. G. B. T.

EQUALITY AND FRATERNITY: by Douglas Maclean, Canon of Salisbury. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.).

THIS book is aimed, one gathers, at common prejudices, which it attacks by means of a host of quotations showing, for example, High Tories as having more consideration for others than Republicans possess, or religious writers more kindness than social reformers. It is a veritable store-house of quotations and should be useful to many speakers on such subjects, if for that alone. Its general tone appears to be somewhat lacking in what may be called the philosophical outlook, e.g., it assumes apparently some opposition between the conceptions of the rights and of the duties of men, instead of showing these as necessarily complementary, and this is typical of the kind of attitude taken throughout. But the industry of its author in collecting apt quotations deserves recognition.

S. B.

DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTEN VON MANFRED MARIA ELLIS:

Gesammelt in Drei Bänden von Werner Hegemann. Band I. Sanssouci Verlag, Berlin. 1924. (The German Works of Manfred Maria Ellis: Collected in 3 vols. by Werner Hegemann. Vol. I.)

THREE parts of varying thickness, but containing between them nearly 650 pages, form one only of the works of the above author. Manfred Maria Ellis—so curiously named—is said to be the son of an American father, a business man—and of a French mother—a great niece of that Prince de Ligne so closely connected with Frederic II. He is presented to us as an "Admirable Crichton" in his ready-to-hand knowledge of literature, history, and politics, living in Italy under conditions of such beauty and luxury, and surrounded by such a constantly changing circle of brilliant authors and philosophers of all nations as would only seem possible to a modern Royalty or to a Maecenas of the ancient world. It is said that *IPHIGENIA*—A COMEDY which forms the first part of the present volume, was an early work. The seven enormously long CONVERSATIONS, of which the other two parts are composed, are said to have been written down by the compiler (Dr. Hegemann) in later years. The speeches are chiefly contributed by the mysterious author, but German writers, von Hofmannsthal, Thomas Mann, von Borchardt—Pierre Lièvre (a Frenchman)—two English writers, Bernard Shaw and Lytton Strachey,—and several other people flit in and out, and contribute remarks or short speeches, more as "agents provocateurs" for Ellis' remarks than as contributors of their own views. There are besides a Foreword and a Conclusion making up with the rest a formidable work. The compiler, Werner Hegemann, keeps well in the background, but one cannot help making a guess that he himself, and not "Manfred Maria Ellis," is the author of the whole.

THE scene of *IPHIGENIA* is set in Greece, amid a large and talkative circle of Gods and Demi-Gods. They all behave in a thoroughly human—nay, even childish manner—losing their tempers, calling each other names, and belabouring each other, much as uncivilised primitive people have always done. The old Greek ideas pervading the old legends are burlesqued; for instance, the idea of Destiny which cannot be escaped is carried to such a pitch that no one makes the least attempt to stay Paris from carrying off Helen under the eyes of Menelaus—the gods having willed it, why resist? Iphigenia, herself escapes the death penalty, being carried off to Tauris in a small boat where she becomes the secondary Consort of King Thoas; she is described also as a great benefactor to his kingdom, as she introduces some of the Greek arts to his rough uncouth peasantry.

ALL this is written in high spirits and treated as a splendid joke. We do not see anything of the tragedy of Iphigenia—of the sacrifice by Agamemnon of his beloved daughter for the sake of his people; it is treated as a good idea to pretend to slay her, so as to mollify the Goddess of Discord, but the other gods are prepared to arrange her escape. Yet in the other two volumes, instances—legendary and historical—of human sacrifice for the good of a nation or even of a group of people are repeatedly discussed in a serious key—in fact, it is perhaps the one subject on which the symposium shows strong feeling. The contradiction in attitudes is glaring—we ask, "What does the author really intend?" and are driven to conclude that he is not so much concerned to retell the old heroic story as to ridicule a current German ideal of womanhood.

THE other main thesis of the book is the character of Frederic the Great, which is treated in an extraordinarily disparaging and belittling manner.

We have always understood that to Germans he remains a great personality and a national hero; Manfred Maria Ellis, however, criticises him with such scorn and bitterness that one is tempted to guess he is attacking a modern German ruler under the guise of "Old Fritz," or rather perhaps a current German view of what a ruler should be. Frederic is represented as a vain, self-centred egotist, wishing to be considered an authority on art and literature and on almost every subject under the sun, and gathering clever people round him only for the satisfaction of being able to expound his own ideas to them, not for the pleasure of hearing them talk. Even his war strategy and his courage are attacked, and also his management of the Prussian finances, which it is suggested, were managed to benefit him and not his country.

THE authority quoted for most of these judgments is the diary of a certain Marquis de Lucchesini, a young Italian, whom Frederic called to his court, made foreign minister, and sent to Poland and to Vienna on various delicate missions. Here it is to be noted that Lucchesini did not come to the Prussian court till 1779, when Frederic was already an old man, when his military prowess was a thing of the past, and when long years of success had made him intolerant of contradiction or even of rivals in any intellectual field, when his habits at table had degenerated and even his personal appearance had ceased to be a matter of pride to him.

THE criticisms of Napoleon the Great are equally destructive though not so detailed. His morals and those of nearly all the military "heroes" of that period are shown up ruthlessly; to students of social history what Hegemann brings out may not be new, but it certainly strips all the "gilt off the gingerbread" and leaves the general reader gasping.

IT is impossible in the course of a short review to discuss all the statements and opinions in this book, though there is ample food for controversy in it. The main impression left by the conversations is not entirely a pleasant one. The author seems to scorn most of the accepted historical judgments; while displaying a vast amount of ready learning he also, perhaps as part of his assumed character, shows a certain coarseness and want of feeling which are flaws in a book otherwise instructive. Through the mouth of the various characters taking part he is able to pronounce varied opinions, but the result lacks unity. The book is further marred by a very involved German style—a great contrast with the simple style of Goethe's prose of which there are many quotations. It represents no doubt the views of a certain school of modern German thought, embittered by the experiences of the last ten years, and anxious to show the world its pacific ideas, its hatred of the old militarism, and the hollowness of its past pretensions.

O. FLETCHER.

THE GUILDHOUSE: A Co-operative Centre for Adult Education
(British Institute of Adult Education, 13 John Street, Adelphi. 1s. 6d.)

"It is open to us to create in our modern towns centres of common life and activity which will express our ideals just as the cathedrals, the abbeys, the colleges, the country houses, expressed the various ideals of past times. Such places will be new. They will not exactly correspond to anything in the past, but they will embody many suggestions from the past while expressing and fulfilling the new wants of a new age. There will be something of the college, something of the country house, something of the art institute,

something of the club in them. They will be a step towards that remodelling of our lives which is so much needed in our industrial cities . . . Let us begin to make Kettering famous by insisting that it shall possess a Co-operative Centre that shall act as a focus for the common life. . . . Care should be taken that the building is not only a fine one in itself but finely placed as a contribution to the Civic ideals of Kettering no less important than the great church which is its fortunate heritage from the middle ages. It should include not only a Co-operative Hall, but a series of rooms capable of being used for art, music, lectures, dancing, in short, for life in its fullness, together with a library for the knowledge of the best in past life to be applied for the making of a better future We need to study our own town to see its faults, its good points, its shortcomings and its possibilities. Such study or civic survey might well centre in such a Co-operative House as one of the chief of its activities leading to further developments of Civic Service." (From the KETTERING QUARTERLY, Autumn, 1921.) This quotation from a local co-operative quarterly issued in the town where co-operation of all types enlists the activities of the place more completely than elsewhere, expresses so exactly the spirit of this book, which is really a Report by the British Institute of Adult Education, that the writer cannot refrain from quoting it.

THE writers of the Report, needless to say, were quite innocent of any such attempt having been made to stir up Kettering to carry out such a plan and their appeal is not specially "co-operative," in the technical sense, but to all voluntary bodies connected with adult education, to combine to carry out such a dream into reality.

THE need is well put forward in a Foreword by Lord Eustace Percy, and the fact that this need is independently realised in various directions shows that it is a real need. This little book puts the case clearly and well, and sets out a plan of organisation in a practical and useful manner. It deserves to be widely read, and if it is read will surely stimulate some town to earn fame by inaugurating such a development. Once started in one place the example would soon be followed elsewhere. Perhaps such a centre may yet be started at Kettering where it was, as at least the reviewer believes, first proposed, and where the workers have so much of the resources of capital in their own hands.

S. B.

BEDALES : A Pioneer School : by J. H. Badley, M.A., Headmaster.
(Methuen & Co. 1924.)

BEDALES is a book that one enjoys reading chiefly perhaps because the author must so have enjoyed writing it. It is not given to many men to have visions, to fewer still is it given to see their visions materialise. Bedales is a living monument to the fact, that if a man believes strongly enough in his own theories, it will be unto him even as he believes.

NONE of the theories propounded strike the reader of to-day as either revolutionary or even new, for much water has flowed under the bridge of education since they were first conceived. It would indeed be almost safe to assert that there exist few modern educationalists who would be bold enough to contest the truth of the general propositions advanced, or who would refrain from paying them lip service. The fact that so few schools have dared, even at this late date, to put them into practice, is eloquent

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testimony to the courage and enthusiasm of the man who, thirty years ago, conceived a scheme of education which ran counter to all existing prejudices and who, pursuing his course through thirty chequered years, has finally justified his scheme by triumphant success.

IN this record of thirty years' work, perhaps the only part of the book, which affords subject for discussion, is that dealing with co-education.

THE publishers' note does indeed claim that all opponents of co-education must now for evermore be silenced, but we venture to think that the book leaves the problem very much as it found it. All that the Bedales experiment can fairly claim to prove is that co-education can be successful in favourable circumstances, i.e., in an exceptional school with an exceptionally gifted staff. It would be difficult to deduce from this fact any argument for the introduction of co-education on a large scale into the Secondary schools of the country.

THIS heartening record of the development of an idea and its translation into fact should be read by those, and they are many, who, while professing admiration for modern educational ideals, doubt their practicability, and prefer to tread the paths hallowed by the experiences of the past, forgetting that too often a man's experience consists in doing the same thing wrong a great many times over.

V. L.

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